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Summary 
This report provides some general recommendations and guidelines for improving net-
work regulation in the short-term to enhance the share of distributed generation (DG) in 
EU-15. These recommendations are mainly based on the research carried out under pre-
vious work packages of the DG-GRID project. 
General recommendations are formulated at the EU level. However, the specific imple-
mentation of most of these recommendations corresponds to national regulators. For this 
reason national questionnaires have been developed and completed to collect the current 
situation and expected developments on each of the particular regulatory topic in each 
DG-GRID participating country. 
Recommendations are organized mainly around two main issues 
• How DSO regulation should be changed for enhancing the share of DG; and  
• What economic signals should be given to DG to achieve its active integration in 
distribution networks. 
Regarding DSO unbundling according to the provision stipulated in the European Di-
rective 2003/54/EC, the main recommendations are as follows. 
The effectiveness of the unbundling provision of the EU Directive is highly dependent 
on their actual enforcement by the Member States. A lack of unbundling at the distribu-
tion level may negatively impact the access conditions for new DG operators trying to 
penetrate the market. This can cause severe problems for new DG operators when DSOs 
display anticompetitive behavior by favoring their own DG units or DG sites owned by 
their previously affiliated companies. 
 
R1: It is recommended to adopt measures for achieving a higher level of national com-
pliance with the requirements of both legal and functional unbundling and for obtaining 
more transparency on the actual state of unbundling (not only in law, but also in fact) in 
the individual MS. This could be done via a semi-annual benchmarking conducted by 
the national regulatory authority or another independent body as a supplement to the 
yearly evaluation in the EU Benchmarking Report. In addition, a separate report deal-
ing solely with the progress in unbundling could be published yearly to shed light on 
major shortcomings and to identify best practices in the MS. 
 
If measures to enhance the implementation of legal and functional unbundling at the 
national level are not deemed sufficient in the long term to achieve non-discriminatory 
network access and transparency, a decision with regard to tighter unbundling provi-
sions has to be taken at the EU level. The unbundling requirements then chosen must 
apply to all operators and to all national markets in order to avoid inconsistencies be-
tween the national dimension of regulatory competences and the EU dimension of a 
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single energy market (European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport, 2007). 
 
R2: Regarding the exemption clause contemplated in the Directive 2003/54/EC on un-
bundling for DSOs with less than 100,000 connections, it is recommended to leave it to 
the discretion of the Member States, provided that transparent procedures for planning, 
operation and accounting are in place. It is vital that the regulator adopts the necessary 
measures and procedures to ensure egalitarian conditions to network access where ver-
tical integration of small DSOs is granted. What these measures should consist of is a 
country-specific issue dependent on the existence of entry barriers, network charging 
methodology and national regulatory framework (e.g., network regulation and support 
mechanisms/prioritized access) in place.  
 
One aspect which should be highlighted in this respect is the kind of connection charg-
ing philosophy. In the absence of transparency, a deep charging method may provide 
vertically integrated DSOs with more incentives and scope for discrimination than a 
shallow charging approach. 
The second regulatory topic is related with DSO revenues and incentives to integrate 
DG. Recommendations are formulated to improve network planning taking into account 
DG, to design regulatory arrangements for compensating DSO extra costs due to DG, 
and to improve DSO performance in quality of service taking into account DG. 
Article 14/7 2003/54/EC Electricity directive stipulates that DG should be considered 
by DSOs when planning the development of the distribution network optimising the 
need for upgrading or replacing network capacity.  
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R3: Some recommendations to implement in practice the Article 14/7 mandate are the 
following ones.  
- Incentive regulation based on price or revenue caps rather than rate of return 
regulation puts more pressure on DSOs for network efficient investment. 
- Under incentive regulation, allocation of allowed investment budgets for the 
next regulatory period for individual DSOs is recommended. DSOs will be al-
lowed to keep efficiency gains, for more than one regulatory period, due to ef-
ficient integration of DG, as incremental profits. 
- It is recommended to implement use-of-system charges for DG and/or support 
mechanisms applied to DG, differentiated by time of use and voltage levels, to-
gether with economic incentives to DG for providing ancillary services to help 
DSOs to operate the network, for instance, providing voltage control and reac-
tive power support, with a more active management of the network by DSOs. 
That will lead to a better optimization of the use of existing facilities, minimiz-
ing the requirement for new installations. 
- The revision of planning and security criteria used by DSOs in order to include 
the potential benefit of DG deferring or reducing network investments is rec-
ommended. Engineering Recommendation P2/6 in UK can be an example to 
follow1.  
 
DSOs with high levels of DG penetration, defined as the energy generated by DG lo-
cally with respect to the local energy consumption, for instance higher than 15-20%, 
should be compensated for incremental CAPEX & OPEX due to DG, mainly because 
network investment and energy losses costs. There are several options to achieve this 
objective. In UK, a revenue increment per each kW of connected DG has been included 
in the DSOs remuneration. In addition, if a DG connection scheme qualifies as a Regis-
tered Power Zone (RPZ), the revenue increment is increased for the first five years of 
operation. DG-GRID project has investigated DSO revenue drivers based on the feed-in 
capacity and the energy delivered by DG modulated according the DG penetration lev-
els. Other options such as allowance for these extra costs in the Regulated Asset Base 
are more appropriate for rate of return regimes.  
 
R4: It is recommended that the specific regulatory mechanism to compensate DSOs for 
incremental CAPEX & OPEX due to DG, should be designed taking into account the 
particular DSO regulatory framework in each country. 
 
Among these extra costs are incremental energy losses. 
                                                 
1“Engineering Recommendation P2/6. Security of Supply”, Energy Networks Association, July 2006. 
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R5: DSOs with distribution areas with high DG penetration/concentration levels could 
be compensated for incremental energy losses. For instance, a DSO revenue driver, in 
€/kWh, associated with DG production (kWh) located in those areas can be imple-
mented. This compensation would mainly come from those generators connected in 
those areas that would be charged with a fee (€/kWh) proportional to the value of the 
incremental losses they produce in the network. On the other hand, it is recommended 
to implement use-of-system charges for DG and/or support mechanisms applied to DG, 
differentiated by voltage levels, to take into account that DG connected in lower voltage 
networks can reduce losses at higher voltage levels. 
 
DSOs have to meet quality of service targets in terms of i) duration and frequency of 
supply interruptions, and ii) voltage quality keeping voltage disturbances within certain 
limits. The potential advantages of having DG as a new control source should become a 
DSO opportunity instead of a threat.  
 
R6: DG can help to improve reliability indices working in islanding mode in case of 
network outages. DG can provide ancillary services such as voltage control, frequency 
reserve, or black start to improve voltage quality. To achieve this aim, it is recom-
mended to implement  
- performance based regulation for quality of service targets that provides ex-
plicit incentives to DSOs for improving quality of service levels.  
- incentives for DSO innovation programs that promote a deep transformation 
from passive to active management increasing DG participation in network 
control and DG contribution in case of network disturbances. 
- incentives to DG for providing ancillary services to help DSOs to operate the 
network, for instance, providing voltage control and reactive power support, 
frequency reserve, islanding operation, etc. to improve quality of service levels. 
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R7: Incentives to promote DSO innovation for efficient integration of DG should be 
incorporated into network regulation. Some of the instruments to implement them can 
be: 
- R&D investments can be included in the Regulated Asset Base as a separate 
item with higher rates of return or with a partial pass-through. An example is 
the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) in UK. A DSO is allowed to spend up to 
0.5% of its revenue on eligible IFI projects. 
- Selection of performance indicators that can be improved through network in-
novation. Several countries have implemented performance regulation to im-
prove quality of supply. 
- Regulators may work with DSOs formulating and testing new regulatory instru-
ments, and developing new regulatory scenarios with a shared vision, in order 
to explore deeper and long-term network transformations. 
The selection of the most appropriate instruments in each country would take into 
account the type of DSO incentive regulation in place and the national regulatory 
framework.  
 
Finally, regarding the third regulatory topic, recommendations about the economic sig-
nals to be given to DG for its efficient integration are proposed. The support mecha-
nisms are critically reviewed. DG connection charges and use-of-system charges should 
be efficiently designed. Ancillary services and other network services provided by DG 
are identified and mechanisms for efficient provision are proposed. 
 
R8: DG (RES/CHP) support mechanisms, especially with high DG shares, should be 
made compatible with energy market prices and network UoS tariffs that promote effi-
cient DG operation and network location. Regarding DG operation to achieve efficient 
market integration it is recommended: 
- RES-E and CHP market stimulation systems should be smartened to better re-
flect the social value of the MWh injected in the system. In case of high DG 
penetration, avoid fixed production payment mechanisms, such as constant 
feed-in tariffs or feed-in subsidies as a general rule.  
- Implement feed-in tariffs with time discrimination or feed-in premiums on top 
of market prices that promote efficient DG operation, i.e. higher production at 
peak hours, and storage and controllability capabilities in medium and large 
size DG installations. 
 
Connection charges are paid just once when DG require network access. Use-of-system 
(UoS) charges are periodically paid by network users, usually end consumers, and, in 
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some MS, also DG. UoS charges should, as far as possible, (i) reflect the cost incurred 
to provide the network user with the network transport and system service, and (ii) en-
sure full recovery of the DSO’s total acknowledged revenues. 
 
R9. To create a level playing field for DG integration, DG connection charges, paid just 
once when the connection is required, should be regulated, based on simple rules 
mainly recognizing shallow costs, i.e. the direct costs of connection. Calculation rules 
should be transparent and standardized by national regulation. Other costs for network 
reinforcements and upgrades due to DG connections should be socialised among the 
network users and paid through the Use of System (UoS) charges. 
 
R10: It is recommended that DG pay or receive UoS charges. DG use of system charges 
should be cost reflective (positive or negative).  
- DG UoS charges should be differentiated by time of use and voltage levels. DG 
connections at lower voltage levels and DG production at load peak hours 
should be incentivized.  
- Differentiated DG support mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs by voltage levels 
can be used to achieve the same effect that differentiated DG UoS charges.  
- DG UoS charges calculation methods should be in line with the other elements 
of the national regulatory framework: DG connection charges, DG support 
mechanisms, DG network services, etc.  
 
DG can contribute significantly to TSO/DSO ancillary and network services. 
  
R11: DG through aggregators can participate in balancing and reserve markets. DG 
can provide voltage support and compensate energy losses as required by DSOs. In the 
future, with higher levels of network automation and DG controllability, DG would help 
to solve congestion management, and to improve quality islanding. Commercial ar-
rangements between TSO/DSO and DG to recognize such contribution can be 
- Regulated payments to DG, for instance acknowledged in the UoS charges 
- Bilateral contracts between DG and DSO  
- DG participation in markets: i) energy balancing and reserve markets; and ii) 
network related markets, such as local balancing, reactive power, congestion 
management, or energy losses compensation. 
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1 Objectives 
This report provides some general recommendations and guidelines for improving net-
work regulation in the short-term to enhance the share of distributed generation (DG). 
These recommendations are mainly based on the research carried out under previous 
work packages of the DG-GRID project.  
The DG-GRID project is structured in four work packages (WP). WP1 reviews the 
regulation of DG in the old EU-15 Member States and also determines the main barriers 
for DG integration. In WP2 new network concepts are identified, and an analysis of the 
consequences of using innovative network concepts (defined for large penetration of 
DG) in the current networks is carried out. WP3 analyses the role of network operators, 
how DG influence in their economic balance, and what improvements in DSO regula-
tion should be assessed. Finally, WP4 collects all the information of the previous WPs, 
and gives general and specific guidelines to increase the proper penetration of DG. The 
following presents a resume of the main findings and conclusions of the different WPs. 
Work package 1 
In WP1 a review of the current regulation of networks with respect to distributed gen-
eration in the EU-15 MS and a comparison among the different systems have been car-
ried out. A start-point for this analysis is to determine the current situation of DG pene-
tration in power systems as shown in Figure 1. Current situation shows that ten coun-
tries have a DG share over total capacity above 10%, and half of them are over 20%. 
Figure 1 DG share of total generation capacity  
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WP1 has also identified the major regulatory barriers for connection of DG (see Table 
1) where the most important are the lack of incentives for the DSO, connection charges, 
procedural barriers and access to energy and balancing markets.  
Table 1 Presence of the main barriers in EU-15 
Barrier AU BE DK FI FR DE GR IRL IT LUX NL P ES SE UK
Connection charges 9 9  9  9 9 9   9   9 9 
Physical/technical network 
constraints 9    9  9 9     9 9 9 
Procedural barriers Network 9    9 9 9  9  9 9 9   
Lack of unbundling  9    9 9   9      
Lack of incentive for proactive 
DSO role 9 9  9 9 9 9 9  9  9 9  9 
Power market entry barriers 9 9  9   9    9 9  9 9 
Procedural barriers Market       9 9     9   
Lack of benefit for DG 9 9     9   9      
 
The main findings of WP1 analysis has been summarized in two deliverables, D1 
“Regulatory Review and International Comparison of EU-15 Member States” and D2 
“Assessment and Recommendations Overcoming in Short-Term Grid System Regula-
tory and other Barriers to Distributed Generation”. 
Work package 2 
In WP2 medium- to long-term changes into the grid structure and how these need to be 
promoted and accompanied by regulatory innovations in order to integrate higher levels 
of DG are investigated. First, a review of innovative network concepts has been carried 
out, identifying different alternatives for the future distribution network. Among these 
new concepts stand active networks, virtual power plants, power cells, intelligent net-
works, and microgrids. To introduce these new concepts into distribution networks radi-
cal shift in DSOs control philosophy will be required, changing from traditional central 
control to a distributed control paradigm based on active network management.  
Under this new paradigm, innovation will be a key issue for delivery of efficient inte-
gration of DG and demand response into operation and development of power systems. 
To achieve this change in DSOs operation paradigm, WP2 has designed a three-step 
regulatory improvement framework: innovating regulation, regulating innovation and 
long-term transformation.  
First, innovation in regulation is needed to minimize the difference of economic inter-
ests between DG and DSOs which is the result of the current incentive structure. For 
this purpose two regulatory innovations are proposed for DSOs remuneration: (i) 
benchmarking including quality, and (ii) the implementation of article 14/7 of the 2003 
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EU electricity directive which requires DSOs to consider DG as an alternative to net-
work expansion. 
In order to introduce innovation in current DSO regulatory schemes, some positive in-
centives for DSOs to connect DG are needed. Under this topic three regulatory alterna-
tives have been analyzed such as: including innovation costs in the regulatory asset 
base, a separate treatment of innovation costs, and extending regulatory periods. 
Finally, medium and long-term promotion of R&D and innovation needs specific regu-
latory mechanisms. WP2 has worked on two instruments to deal with the uncertainty for 
future system transformation: (i) developing long-term visions through scenarios and 
(ii) experimentation with regulatory instruments in “Regulatory innovation zones”. 
The main findings of WP2 have been summarized in two reports, D4 “Review of Inno-
vative Network Concepts” and, D5 “Regulating Innovation & Innovating Regulation”.  
Work package 3 
In WP3 costs and benefits associated with DG integration in distribution networks are 
identified and evaluated. First, the impact of DG on network losses, voltage profile, 
fault level / short circuit power and investment schemes is assessed. The evaluation has 
been carried out considering different DG technologies such as PV, CHP and small hy-
dro. The impact of two different operating regimes namely passive and active network 
management has also been investigated. The results cover UK and Finnish cases based 
on generic distribution network models of rural and urban networks. 
The general conclusions of the analysis are: 
-Reinforcement costs will increase as the DG penetration level increases. DG contribute 
to energy losses reduction when the penetration is low, but increases losses for high DG 
penetration. 
-Under traditional passive network operation philosophy, a large amount of investment 
is needed to upgrade current network assets in order to accommodate new DG. Active 
management can clearly reduce these upgrade costs, as it has been demonstrated for the 
UK and Finnish rural networks. Different results are obtained for Finnish urban net-
works, where active management increases investment costs compared with passive 
management. However, active network management should not only be justified with 
cost reduction, but also with improving the controllability and operation of the distribu-
tion and transmission networks with high penetration of DG. 
-The effect of intermittent and non-intermittent generation depends on the balance be-
tween generation and load. Micro CHP has a good effect on losses reduction as its gen-
eration is coincident with the peak load, both in the UK and Finnish cases. On the other 
hand, PV maximum output occurs in summer while maximum load is in winter – in 
Finland as well as in the UK. Finally hydropower only impacts on rural networks. 
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A more detailed analysis can be found in two reports D7 “Method for Monetarisation of 
Cost and Benefits of DG Options”, and D8 “Costs and Benefits of DG Connections to 
Grid System”. 
A second topic in WP3 is the analysis of DSO business models in order to evaluate the 
impact of DG connection and network integration on DSO costs, revenues, and profits. 
A first analysis is made on report D9 “Evolving network regulation to efficiently ac-
commodate distributed generation”. This report identifies the cost impacts of the provi-
sion of access of increasing volume of DG to their networks by DSOs and the contrac-
tual relationships between the DSO and DG operators. In addition, the roles of DG and 
DSOs in the provision of ancillary services are analyzed. 
A second analysis on this topic from a more quantitative perspective was conducted. It 
was observed, that the combination of a special allowance and a direct revenue driver is 
the most successful regulatory arrangement in compensating the negative DG impact on 
DSO costs. Under this option DSOs will be able to recover their costs and at the same 
time are stimulated to connect existent and new types of DG. In order to implement 
these criteria, some policy actions are proposed: 
-Current regulation of DSOs should recognize the impact of DG on DSO performance. 
-Implement a DSO regulatory formula where the impact of DG on both operating ex-
penditures and capital expenditures would be taken into account. 
-Initially it may be needed some ‘overcompensation’ of possible negative DG impact on 
DSOs in order to provide them an explicit incentive to facilitate and accommodate new 
DG connections in their distribution networks. 
-Compensatory regulation for DG penetration is intertwined with the developments in 
the field of ancillary services provision by DG. On the one hand, DSOs might need to 
be compensated for the negative impact following the penetration for DG. On the other 
hand, if DSOs benefit from the provision of ancillary services enabled by DG penetra-
tion, the DSO should compensate the DG operators. 
A deeper analysis on DSOs business models can be found in the report D10 “Business 
models for DSOs under alternative regulatory regimes”. 
Work package 4 
This report synthesizes the work in WP4, giving guidelines and recommendations as a 
result of the research conducted in DG-GRID. The report is organized around two main 
issues 
• First, how DSO regulation should be changed for enhancing the share of DG; 
and  
• Second, what economic signals should be given to DG to achieve its active inte-
gration in distribution networks. 
For each recommendation a general description of the problem and the current situation 
is provided. Main drawbacks and barriers for DG integration are identified. Finally, 
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guidelines to improve the current situation with the corresponding recommendations are 
proposed identifying the entity responsible for their development and implementation. 
The aim of these recommendations is twofold. First it would be desirable to formulate 
general recommendations valid at EU level. Second, specific treatment at national level 
including discussion and proposals on how to implement such recommendations will be 
provided for the countries involved in DG-GRID. To achieve this later objective a spe-
cific questionnaire has been designed to collect the corresponding information including 
the opinion of national regulators. 
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2 DSO regulation 
Several topics are discussed regarding DSO regulation and DG integration.  The issues 
where recommendations are proposed are: 
• DSO Unbundling 
• DSO revenues and incentives to integrate DG 
• DSO incentives for innovation 
2.1 DSO Unbundling 
Traditionally, generation, transmission and distribution of electricity have been carried 
out by vertically integrated monopolies. Liberalisation of the electricity industry re-
quires the adoption of unbundling, i.e., the “separation of the various components of 
production, distribution and service in order to introduce greater elements of competi-
tion to these segments of an industry” 2. 
Of particular relevance for Distributed Generation (DG) are the unbundling require-
ments for Distribution System Operators (DSOs). Those are stipulated in Directive 
2003/54/EC, Art. 15 (1): “where the distribution system operator is part of a vertically 
integrated undertaking, it shall be independent in terms of its legal form, organisation 
and decision making from other activities not relating to distribution”. In addition to 
legal unbundling, certain criteria of functional unbundling have to be met. The latter 
have been established to guarantee the DSO’s independence with regard to its organisa-
tion and decision making, such as effective decision-making rights independent from 
the integrated undertaking with respect to assets to operate, maintain and develop the 
network. The provisions of functional unbundling are laid down in Article 15 (2) of the 
same Directive.  
                                                 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/u_en.html 
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Figure 2 Unbundling of the DSO (Source: adapted from DG Grid Report D 1, p. 
12) 
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The unbundling requirements at the distribution level differ from those at the transmis-
sion level in two important respects: first, legal unbundling of the DSO may be post-
poned until the date of full market opening, 1 July 2007 (Dir. 2003/54/EC, Art. 30 (2)). 
Second, Art. 15 lays down the possibility for an exemption: Member States may decide 
to exempt integrated electricity undertakings serving less than 100,000 customers, or 
serving small isolated systems, from the unbundling provisions. This exemption is not 
limited in time. 
2.1.1 National compliance on DSO unbundling  
The effectiveness of the unbundling provisions of the EU Directive is highly dependent 
on their actual enforcement by the Member States. A lack of unbundling at the distribu-
tion level may negatively impact the access conditions for new DG operators trying to 
penetrate the market (especially independent power producers). Since networks are op-
erated as natural monopolies, fair and non-discriminatory network access is an essential 
condition for the development of competition in the generation segment. There is 
asymmetry of information as DSOs have access to market sensitive information, e.g., 
through the collection of metering data and the managing of exchange of information. 
Aggravation of network access may occur in different ways: e.g., transmission and dis-
tribution system operators may claim a lack of capacity, charge excessive transport fees, 
delay access by long negotiations, litigation and manipulation of price (Wälde, 2001). 
Furthermore, a lack of unbundling coupled with a lack of transparency bears the risk of 
cross-subsidies between the competitive segment and the regulated network activity. 
For instance, an incumbent can use his distribution assets as collateral for his more risky 
commercial activities as the latter activities deliver higher revenues than regulated net-
work activities (higher risk asks for higher return), while new suppliers do not have 
such kind of collaterals generating a stable income stream. All these factors can cause 
severe problems for new DG operators when DSOs display anticompetitive behavior by 
favoring their own DG units or DG sites owned by their previously affiliated compa-
nies. 
DG-GRID: Guidelines for improvement network regulation for enhancing the share of DG 
18 
Table 2 depicts the current state of DSO unbundling in selected Member States and the 
existence of national plans for the implementation of more effective ways of DSO un-
bundling. 
Table 2 Implementation of Unbundling  
Country Type of unbundling 
implemented 
Plans to implement more effective ways of 
DSO unbundling 
Austria Legal No 
Denmark Legal No 
Finland Legal (if amount of 
electricity distrib-
uted in 0.4 kV level 
> 200GWh/year) 
No 
France Management Not in short-term, but envisaged improve-
ment of accounting transparency. 
Germany Legal No 
Italy Accounting manda-
tory  
Legal facultative for 
large DSOs  
Review process with aim of introducing 
functional unbundling. Proposals concern the 
timeliness of moving towards ownership 
unbundling of some activities. 
Proposal to develop simplified approach to 
accounting unbundling. 
Netherlands Legal 
One small DSO 
ownership unbun-
dled 
Functional unbundling by 1st July 2008. 
Discussions of ownership unbundling (see 
below). 
Spain Legal Draft of new regulation to transpose Direc-
tive 2003/54/EC nationally, especially to 
adopt functional unbundling. 
UK Legal Effective unbundling priority area; if inde-
pendent network operation cannot be ensured 
under existing framework, the UK would 
support ownership unbundling. 
 
Table 2 illustrates that legal unbundling of DSOs is the prevalent form of unbundling 
adopted. However, this statement has to be read with caution as there may be discrepan-
cies between the minimum unbundling stipulated by national law and its actual en-
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forcement. E.g., in Greece legal unbundling has been formally established, but the sin-
gle national grid operator is still strongly bound to the national utility PPC (Skytte et al., 
2005). As the process of unbundling of DSOs is currently still in transition (until July 
2007), no final evaluation can be made at this point in time; however, it is important to 
remove shortcomings that are already apparent. 
Table 3 Ownership of DG by DSOs 
Country Can DSOs own DG under specific circumstances? 
Austria Yes. 
Denmark No, but exemption for small DSOs. 
Finland In general no. 
Only if amount of electricity distributed in 0.4 kV level < 
200GWh/year in past 3 years, then financial unbundling required. 
France Yes, but accounting unbundling. 
Germany Yes, but accounting unbundling. 
Italy Yes 
Netherlands No 
Spain No, but exemption for small DSOs. 
UK No, but private distribution networks/independent DNOs may 
own DG. 
 
No specific problems related to DSO unbundling and network integration of DG were to 
be found in Denmark, Germany, Finland and the UK. 
In Austria, some past incidents have been reported by independent power producers in 
which insufficiently unbundled daughter companies of DSOs received preferential 
treatment in the development for sites of wind projects. 
In France, access to distribution systems is sometimes considered as insufficiently 
transparent. It is, however, difficult to consider that unbundling plays a role in that. In 
fact, obstacles are often due to the reluctance of DSOs to facilitate the access to their 
system for “cultural reasons”, i.e., a culture of centralized power generation, and also 
for “technical reasons” (due to the difficulties associated to DG development). 
In Italy, the main problem related to unbundling is the lack of transparency. The AEEG 
is therefore revising the unbundling requirements to reach a so-called “functional un-
bundling”. 
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In the Netherlands, from a practical point of view, the major issue is cross-subsidization 
of commercial activities by network companies of integrated incumbents as well as the 
extraction of capital from DSOs that is used for commercial activities instead for re-
placement investments and innovation. 
In Spain, there have been network access conflicts, which were reported by DG owners 
resulting from discriminatory treatment by the DSOs, as well as technical problems 
such as overloads or voltages out of margin. 
 
R1: It is recommended to adopt measures for achieving a higher level of national com-
pliance with the requirements of both legal and functional unbundling and for obtaining 
more transparency on the actual state of unbundling (not only in law, but also in fact) in 
the individual MS. This could be done via a semi-annual benchmarking conducted by 
the national regulatory authority or another independent body as a supplement to the 
yearly evaluation in the EU Benchmarking Report. In addition, a separate report deal-
ing solely with the progress in unbundling could be published yearly to shed light on 
major shortcomings and to identify best practices in the MS. If measures to enhance the 
implementation of legal and functional unbundling at the national level are not deemed 
sufficient in the long term to achieve non-discriminatory network access and transpar-
ency, a decision with regard to tighter unbundling provisions has to be taken at the EU 
level (Section 2.1.2). The unbundling requirements then chosen must apply to all opera-
tors and to all national markets in order to avoid inconsistencies between the national 
dimension of regulatory competences and the EU dimension of a single energy market 
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2007). 
Regulation level: National MS Regulators and possibly EU. 
 
2.1.2 Discussion of Ownership Unbundling and Independent System Operators 
The way in which unbundling has been introduced did not prove to be effective in guar-
anteeing non-discriminatory network access. This is why the EU has launched the dis-
cussion on two alternative solutions: ownership unbundling or the establishment of an 
independent system operator (ISO). In its Memo “The Internal Energy Market: Founda-
tion of the EU Energy Policy” from January 2007, the European Commission identifies 
as a key measure: 
“new rules to avoid discrimination, for instance so that a company owning both power genera-
tion and distribution network does not hinder the access of other companies to the market. Two 
unbundling options could redress the problem. The most radical is called “ownership unbun-
dling”, by which vertically integrated companies would be split between their different activi-
ties. Another possibility would be the creation of independent system operators, by which system 
operation would separated from the ownership of assets” 
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2007) . 
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At the national level, a discussion to go further than the provisions of legal unbundling 
stipulated by Directive 2003/54/EC has been carried out in the Netherlands: ownership 
unbundling was proposed by the Minister of Economic Affairs which has submitted the 
law of independent network management to the Lower House. The Lower House agreed 
in majority with ownership unbundling. However, last year the vision of the parliament 
with respect to ownership unbundling has radically changed; the Upper House has made 
the decision that DSOs are not obliged to unbundling, unless the European Union de-
cides to do so or if utilities undertake actions that risk to give foreign entities undue con-
trol over their networks or if utilities exercise undue market power, e.g., through tacitly 
impeding level-playing-field access by third parties.3 In fact, the Upper House overruled 
the Lower House, which earlier in majority agreed on ownership unbundling. However, 
there is still a lot of vagueness concerning the precise nature of the situations that would 
result in enforced unbundling. 
2.1.3 Exemption clause on DSO unbundling  
In addition to problems related to the implementation of unbundling in law and in fact, 
there is the case of the optional exemption clause where unbundling does not have to be 
adopted at all. The overall effect of this exemption clause depends on the number of 
DSOs with less than 100,000 connections, how many per cent of the connections fall 
into this category in the individual MS and if those DSOs own generation connected to 
their networks. Especially small-scale DG is often connected to the low voltage net and 
deployed in rural areas where there are many DSOs with less than 100,000 connections 
(Skytte, Ropenus et al. 2005, p. 81). 
                                                 
3 Kamerstuk 2006-2007, Eerste Kamer (Upper House), 30 212, H. 
DG-GRID: Guidelines for improvement network regulation for enhancing the share of DG 
22 
Table 4 DSOs with less than 100,000 connections 
Country Number 
of DSOs 
Number of 
DSOs with less 
than 100,000 
connections 
% of con-
nections 
that fall 
into this 
category 
Do these small DSOs 
own generation con-
nected to their net-
works? 
Austria 138 119 12% Yes 
Denmark 120 112 43% No 
Finland 91 85 51% Yes, but accounting 
separation 
France 166 160 5% Yes 
Germany 950 900 n.a. Yes 
Italy 170 n.a. n.a. Yes 
Netherlands 10 5 3% No 
Spain 308 303 3% Yes 
UK 18 3 1% Yes 
 
As the situation is very different from country to country, the effect of small DSO un-
bundling requirements on DG development varies – also dependent on whether the exis-
tence of integrated small DSOs constitutes a barrier for DG integration or not. There-
fore, before giving a general recommendation at the EU level on this issue, it is impor-
tant to collect information of the particular situation in each country involved in DG-
GRID. Pros and cons of requiring legal unbundling for small DSOs regarding DG con-
nection and development should be identified in each particular case. In the following, 
the advantages and disadvantages of requiring also unbundling of these small DSOs 
regarding effective DG integration are given on a country-by-country basis. 
In Austria, the detrimental impact on DG integration due to the existence of small inte-
grated DSOs is negligible. Unbundling would hit severely very small DSOs that have 
very little staff so they cannot provide separation without prohibitive increases in per-
sonnel costs. There are no current plans to introduce legal and functional unbundling for 
these DSOs. Even to force the medium-sized DSOs between 10.000 and 100.000 con-
nections to unbundle would probably not foster DG employment since some of these 
integrated DSO invest innovatively in DG – presumably because they integrate genera-
tion and distribution. 
In Denmark, there are no problems for DG integration related to the existence of inte-
grated small DSOs. 
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In Finland, it is difficult to assess whether there are specific DG integration problems 
arising from small DSOs’ integration as all DSOs have an obligation to connect network 
power generating installations. Unbundling would provide the advantage of having less 
diffusion of confidential information to other suppliers or traders. However, unbundling 
would entail the disadvantage of extra personnel and systems costs for small companies 
which can result in higher DG connection and operation costs. There are no plans to 
require legal and functional unbundling for small DSOs. 
In France, DSO integration does not appear to be an obstacle to the further developing 
of DG. Small DSOs have the same obligations as EDF to open their network to DG un-
der certain technical conditions. They have to implement cost accounting and separate 
production and distribution. As DG integration is a legal obligation for DSOs, there is 
no apparent reason to move towards more unbundling. Deepening the unbundling re-
quirements could even reduce the effectiveness of distribution network management by 
reducing the coordination with DG owned by local distributors. In fact, there is no pos-
sible competition between different DG operators. 
Also, in Germany there are no specific problems for DG integration related to the exis-
tence of integrated small DSOs. Although there are theoretical arguments for full DSO 
unbundling to promote DG, it is doubtful that DSO unbundling in Germany would help 
in practice and there are no current plans to do so. Regulation of network tariffs and 
clear rules are certainly more important. 
In Italy, no specific problems related to small DSO integration could be identified ei-
ther. The establishment of functional unbundling for all the network operators is under 
way. 
In the Netherlands, there are also no specific obstacles to DG development stemming 
from the integration of small DSOs. The advantages of unbundling consist in having a 
more independent DSO that sets that the interests of the DSOs at the forefront instead of 
the interests of the utility as a whole. Furthermore, it would be beneficial as to the 
achievement of a level playing field (no competitive advantages of integrated utilities); 
and supervision and administrative costs of the regulator would be lower if there was 
one system applicable to all DSOs instead of two systems to different DSOs. One of the 
major drawbacks associated with unbundling is a loss of efficiency due to a loss of 
economies of scope. DSOs are already obliged by law to complete functional unbun-
dling in 2008. The law does not make any difference between large and small DSOs at 
this point. In the Netherlands there is made a distinction between a so-called 'fat' net-
work administrator as will be the case in 2008 compared to a 'lean' DSO as is now the 
case. A 'fat' network administrator has its own decision making rights, has the economic 
ownership of the network and the disposal of own financing sources (the network). 
Also, legal limits have been set for contracting out tasks to other parties. 
In Spain, some conflicts of DG access to small DSO networks have been reported; how-
ever, the importance of these small DSOs is only marginal so that the regulator does not 
consider this subject as a priority. There is no political willingness for additional unbun-
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dling requirements at the regional level, where these companies have a long tradition, 
nor at the national level. 
No specific problems related to small DSO integration were found in the UK. 
 
In theory, there is a trade-off between the introduction of unbundling to guarantee fair 
access conditions and the additional burden put on small DSOs in terms of costs and 
complexity of system integration. However, in practice the exemption clause does not 
constitute a major barrier with regard to network access in the above mentioned Mem-
ber States. Rather, the exemption clause is of great importance for those Member States 
with a high number of small DSOs. First, the adoption of unbundling would entail high 
transaction costs particularly for small DSOs. Second, vertical integration of small 
DSOs may enhance their ability and incentive to innovate when integrating more small 
DG units into their networks. Solutions they develop to integrate their own DG sites can 
be applied when connecting DG units of new independent producers. Therefore, the 
impact of the exemption clause has to be assessed rather on a country by country basis 
than on the European level, taking into account the structure of the distribution sector 
and the regulatory framework in the individual Member States. 
R2: It is recommended to leave the exemption clause for small DSOs to the discretion of 
the Member States, provided that transparent procedures for planning, operation and 
accounting are in place. It is vital that the regulator adopts the necessary measures and 
procedures to ensure egalitarian conditions to network access where vertical integra-
tion of small DSOs is granted. What these measures should consist of is a country-
specific issue dependent on the existence of entry barriers, network charging methodol-
ogy and national regulatory framework (e.g., network regulation and support mecha-
nisms/prioritized access) in place.  
One aspect which should be highlighted in this respect is the kind of connection charg-
ing philosophy. In the absence of transparency, a deep charging method may provide 
vertically integrated DSOs with more incentives and scope for discrimination than a 
shallow charging approach. Connection charges are discussed more thoroughly in Sec-
tion 3.2. 
2.2 DSO revenues and incentives to integrate DG 
Under unbundling, DSOs are a regulated wire business. In most countries of Europe, 
DSOs revenues are determined by incentive regulation. Price caps or revenue caps set 
the tariffs for a period of several years (three to five). This is a regulatory incentive that 
leads DSOs to reduce costs and investments, while regulators should control that these 
reductions do not adversely affect the quality of service. 
In general, the integration of DG in distribution networks means an important challenge 
for DSOs. DG integration not only impacts on short-term DSO costs but also involves 
new DSO risk uncertainty regarding system reliability, security, and network planning.  
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Therefore, it is important to accurately analyse the effects of a DG extension on the 
DSOs’ interests within every step of the incentive regulation mechanism and to develop 
approaches 
 to systematically take into account additional costs for DSOs, 
 to at least neutralise the negative incentives on the allowed revenues of the DSOs 
resulting from a volume reduction in the case of auto-generation or independent area 
networks. 
In DG-GRID several quantitative analyses have been carried out where DSO incre-
mental costs as a function of DG penetration levels have been assessed. Incremental 
network reinforcement costs, energy losses, active network management costs, and 
other operational costs have been identified and evaluated. In addition, a multi-year 
simulation of DSO revenues, under current incentive regulation, shows that if DSOs are 
not compensated for these incremental costs, DSO profits will decrease as DG penetra-
tion levels increase, therefore increasing the DSO reluctance to connect DG.  
Figures 3 and 4 represent how the traditional DSO management model should be modi-
fied to take into account an effective integration of DG. 
Under the traditional DSO management model, demand increase and new demand sup-
plies are the main driver for system development and reinforcement. Planning and op-
erational criteria are based on passive management, i.e. new installations are planned 
and operated under the “fit and forget” principle. Allowed capital expenditures 
(CAPEX) and operational expenditures (OPEX) are remunerated through a price cap or 
revenue cap formula. Incentives (penalties) for improving (not achieving specific tar-
gets) quality of service indicators or/and network energy losses are also included in the 
DSO annual remuneration. A more detailed view of how distribution regulation is im-
plemented in the European countries participating in the DG-GRID project is presented 
in the following subsections. 
To achieve an efficient DG network integration, the traditional DSO management model 
must migrate to a more complex model where additional costs and benefits from DG 
should be incorporated. New DG connections and DG operation is a new driver for sys-
tem development and operation. DSOs have to provide network services to any network 
user including demands and generators.  In this new management model with high DG 
penetration levels, network active management (AM) for maximizing the use of existing 
assets while maintaining the required quality of service standards will become a critical 
issue. AM actions include: (i) power flow management by DG to avoid line overload-
ing, (ii) voltage control, (iii) power quality management, (iv) demand side management, 
and (v) fault level control by specific devices. Active management will deeply impact 
on current DSO operation and planning practices, and, consequently, on DSO CAPEX 
and OPEX. AM in distribution networks will potentially reduce network reinforce-
ments, although it may increase OPEX as the network is operated more intensively. 
Additionally, AM will increase also investments in communication and control equip-
ment. To obtain the benefits derived from AM, specific services and contracts between 
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DG and DSO should be designed, such as dispatch generation contracts and contracts 
for interruptible loads. 
On the other hand, DSOs obtain their allowed revenues through use-of-system charges 
paid by network users, demands and in some countries distributed generators. In addi-
tion, new connections should pay connections charges associated with the required in-
vestments to connect the user to the distribution network. There are two main ap-
proaches for connection charges, deep or shallow charges. Shallow connection charges 
only comprise the costs of connecting to the nearest point of the distribution network, 
while deep charges include in addition to the connection installation all the required 
network reinforcements inside the distribution network. Deep charges provide a strong 
locational signal. However they represent a financial barrier to new network users, spe-
cially for distributed generation. For efficient integration of DG shallow connection 
charges are recommended, while all the network reinforcements required inside the dis-
tribution network should be recovered through use-of-system charges. That assumption 
was thoroughly justified in SUSTELNET4, a previous European project, and it will be 
adopted as an assumption in the rest of this document. 
                                                 
4 M.J.J. Scheepers, 'Policy and Regulatory Roadmaps for the Integration of Distributed Generation and 
the Development of Sustainable Electricity Networks', Final Report of the SUSTELNET project, ECN 
Report ECN-C-04-034, 2004, NL. 
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Figure 3 The traditional DSO management model 
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Figure 4 The new DSO management model with effective integration of DG 
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In the following, different aspects of DSO regulation that impact on the DSO business 
model and related to network investments, incremental OPEX and CAPEX, and DSO 
performance on energy losses and quality of service are analyzed. Recommendations to 
improve DG integration in distribution networks are formulated.  
 
2.2.1 Network planning taking into account DG  
Article 14/7 of the EU electricity directive requires DSOs to consider DG as an alterna-
tive to network expansion. Although it is very important for the further development of 
DG that its potential to replace network investments becomes realised, there is no con-
cept yet as to how this provision can be implemented and backed up by appropriate 
regulatory mechanisms and incentives for unbundled network operators. That it is even 
more challenging if DSOs are effectively unbundled and therefore they can not own 
DG. 
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According to the questionnaires that have been completed among the DG-GRID partici-
pating countries, in four of the nine European countries, i.e. Finland, France, Germany, 
and Italy, distribution investments are remunerated based on a cost of service or rate of 
return regulation. That means that DSOs report network investments to the regulator, 
allowed investments are remunerated to a pre-specified rate of return. Therefore, this 
type of regulation does not provide specific incentives to DSOs for efficient network 
expansions taken advantages of the potential DG benefits.  
In Finland, network investments are remunerated at standard costs calculating the re-
placement value of the network asset. Basically efficiency requirements are related to 
OPEX. It is foreseen that in the next regulatory period (2008-2011), efficiency input-
output models will be implemented. 
In France, every year DSOs report investment programs to the regulator. Allowed in-
vestments are remunerated at a fixed rate of return. The main problem for the regulator 
to control efficient investment is the lack of transparency and the quality of the informa-
tion. 
In Germany, DSO investments are considered when calculating DSO revenues. How-
ever there is not mechanism to promote efficient investment. Incentive regulation will 
start in 2009. The problem to allocate investment budgets, for instance, is that in Ger-
many are more than 700 DSOs.  
In Italy, despite a RPI-X price cap has been implemented for OPEX, DSO network in-
vestments are explicitly remunerated at a fixed rate of return. An incentive framework 
aimed at improving energy efficiency has been also implemented with energy efficiency 
certificates and quota obligations. DSOs can propose projects and investments to reach 
the targets. 
On the other hand, five countries, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Austria and the UK, 
have implemented incentive regulation, that, in theory, will promote CAPEX and OPEX 
reductions while keeping quality of supply standards. 
In Denmark, the regulator can increase the cap level if, due to DG connections, it is es-
timated that is needed. However, there are no explicit mechanisms to induce DSOs for 
efficient investments taking into account DG. 
In Netherlands, caps apply to TOTEX the sum of CAPEX and OPEX. Therefore, effi-
cient investment is implicitly considered as improvement in quality of supply is re-
warded. In addition, yardstick competition is implemented. Therefore DSOs always 
look for firm-specific investments that provide them comparative advantages. DG is not 
considered as a measure to lower network costs. 
In Spain, a revenue cap applies for OPEX together with CAPEX. This scheme has not 
been updated for 8 years. DSOs have been strongly addressed to minimize network in-
vestments. On the other hand, DG deep connection charges, has leaded to DSOs to 
charge DG with network extensions not totally justified. A new proposal for DSO regu-
DG-GRID: Guidelines for improvement network regulation for enhancing the share of DG 
29 
lation that considers incremental DSO revenues associated to efficient network expan-
sions is under discussion. 
In UK, every five years the DSO price control is reviewed. Under price control there is 
an implicit mechanism for efficient investment. In addition, the Engineering Recom-
mendation P2/6 acknowledges the DG contribution to network security. However, there 
is not strong evidence that DSOs have relied on DG to reduce their network invest-
ments. Moreover, the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) and the Registered Power 
Zones (RPZ) are two mechanism implemented by the regulator in the period 2005-2010 
to encourage DSOs to invest efficiently and economically. 
As a summary, incentive regulation based on price or revenue caps, provides an implicit 
incentive to DSOs to reduce network investments. The problem here can be the oppo-
site. How to compensate DSOs if, due to connections of DG, network reinforcements 
are needed? See next section on incremental CAPEX due to DG. 
The following table summarizes the main findings regarding network expansion taking 
into account DG. 
Finland and Germany have plans to migrate also to incentive regulation. Therefore, in-
centive regulation is becoming the most used mechanism in Europe to remunerate 
DSOs. Under incentive regulation, the question is how to allocate specific incentives to 
DSOs for DG integration that in the long-term will reduce the need for network expan-
sions. Under this mechanism, a possible scheme to promote efficient investment can be 
formulated as follows. The regulator will allocate investment budgets for each individ-
ual DSO for the next regulatory period. This scheme leaves all system optimising deci-
sions completely up to DSOs. At the end of the regulatory period, the DSO should in-
form to the regulator on the network investment actually implemented. Efficiency gains 
on investments due to DG, for instance, investment in active network management that 
integrates DG in order to postpone network reinforcements, will be recognized to the 
DSO as an allowed profit in that period. This scheme, by the contrary, can be expensive 
in terms of regulatory control. Technical experts on behalf of the regulator should assess 
the efficiency of implemented actions. However it put pressure on both, regulator and 
DSO, in order to take into account efficient integration of DG when allocating invest-
ment budgets. 
From an operational point of view, to achieve network efficiency due to DG, it is re-
quired to implement locational signals that promote the DG contribution to the peak 
demand, i.e. the location of DG close to the demand and their production in local peak 
hours. Use of system charges for DG and/or support mechanisms applied to DG, differ-
entiated by time of use and voltage levels is a way of implementing these locational 
signals. For instance, support mechanisms for DG based on renewable or CHP, such as 
feed-in tariffs or feed-in premiums, should incentive DG production at peak hours rather 
than at valley hours. Moreover, use of system charges and/or support mechanisms 
should recognize network benefits to DG connected in lower voltage networks rather 
than those in higher voltage networks. In addition, DG should be economically compen-
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sated for providing ancillary services to help DSOs to operate the network, for instance, 
providing voltage control and reactive power support, especially in rural networks. All 
of these signals together with a more active management of the network by DSOs will 
lead to a better optimization of the use of existing facilities, minimizing the requirement 
for new installations. Section 3 of this report provides guidelines for the implementation 
of these actions.  
Table 5 Incentives to DSO for efficient network expansion 
Type of regulation 
for investment 
Countries Incentives for efficient 
network expansion 
Guidelines 
Rate of return Finland, 
France, Ger-
many, Italy 
NO  Migrate to incen-
tive regulation. 
Incentive regulation: 
price or revenue 
caps 
Denmark, 
Netherlands, 
Spain, Aus-
tria 
YES. Investments dropped 
significantly for various 
reasons.  
Implement explicit 
mechanisms to 
take into account 
DG. 
Incentive regulation 
plus ad-hoc explicit 
mechanisms 
UK YES.  
Engineering Recommen-
dation P2/6 acknowledges 
DG contribution for sys-
tem expansion.  
IFI and RPZ mechanisms. 
Evaluate and refine 
already imple-
mented mecha-
nisms. 
 
Finally, another type of actions in order to take into account the potential benefit of DG 
by deferring network investments is to update planning and security criteria used by 
DSOs. In some countries, as in UK, planning criteria that should be met by DSOs have 
been reviewed in order to take into account DG as an alternative to network expansion. 
The Engineering Recommendation P2/6 acknowledges the DG contribution to network 
security. This technical recommendation mandates DSOs to evaluate the contribution of 
the DG to the peak demand, depending on the technology and the number of DG units, 
when calculating network reinforcements. For instance, the required transformer in-
stalled capacity in a distribution substation could be reduced depending on the amount 
of DG connected in the distribution network supplied by that substation. 
 
R3. Article 14/7 2003/54/EC Electricity directive stipulates that DG should be consid-
ered by DSOs when planning the development of the distribution network optimising the 
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need for upgrading or replacing network capacity. Some recommendations to imple-
ment in practice such mandate are the following ones.  
- Incentive regulation based on price or revenue caps rather than rate of return 
regulation puts more pressure on DSOs for network efficient investment. 
- Under incentive regulation, allocation of allowed investment budgets for the 
next regulatory period for individual DSOs is recommended. DSOs will be al-
lowed to keep efficiency gains, for more than one regulatory period, due to effi-
cient integration of DG, as incremental profits. 
- It is recommended to implement use-of-system charges for DG and/or support 
mechanisms applied to DG, differentiated by time of use and voltage levels, to-
gether with economic incentives to DG for providing ancillary services to help 
DSOs to operate the network, for instance, providing voltage control and reac-
tive power support, with a more active management of the network by DSOs. 
That will lead to a better optimization of the use of existing facilities, minimizing 
the requirement for new installations. 
- The revision of planning and security criteria used by DSOs in order to include 
the potential benefit of DG deferring or reducing network investments is recom-
mended. Engineering Recommendation P2/6 in UK can be an example to fol-
low5.  
Regulation level: National MS Regulators. 
 
2.2.2 Incremental OPEX + CAPEX due to DG  
Under the DG-GRID project a deep investigation on technical and economic impacts of 
DG penetration on distribution networks has been carried out. This analysis identified 
some relevant factors that affect the magnitude and direction of such impact. Among 
them, the level of DG penetration in the network, defined as the energy generated by 
DG locally with respect to the total energy consumption, and the concentration of DG 
capacity, defined by the physical location of DG units inside each voltage network lev-
el, were the most relevant. The conclusions of these analyses show that DSOs generally 
do not benefit for DG, except for cases where DG penetration is low (below 23% in the 
study cases) and for low concentration of these units in the network. Benefits in these 
situations are mainly due to energy losses reduction. Higher penetration levels result in 
a negative impact on DSO benefits, and the more concentrated the presence of DG in 
the distribution network, the more negative the impact. Incremental network invest-
ments and energy losses increases are the reason for this observed behaviour. 
                                                 
5 “Engineering Recommendation P2/6. Security of Supply”, Energy Networks Association, July 2006. 
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In order to neutralise the negative impacts of high DG penetration levels on DSO in-
cremental costs, to adopt some kind of regulatory compensation mechanism is strongly 
recommended. 
The DG-GRID questionnaires were used to analyze how DSO regulation in European 
countries acknowledges for incremental DSO costs, in our case due to DG. DG-GRID 
participating countries have been classified according the type of regulation they use to 
remunerate CAPEX and OPEX. First, France and Germany use rate of return or cost of 
service regulation for both. Then, Finland and Italy use rate of return for CAPEX and 
incentive regulation for OPEX. Finally, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Austria and the 
UK use incentive regulation for both, CAPEX and OPEX. 
In France, CAPEX and OPEX are remunerated based on a cost of service regulation. 
DSOs have an incentive to reduce annually OPEX by 3%. Under this regime DSOs can 
obtain compensations for over-costs due to DG. 
In Germany, OPEX and CAPEX are explicitly recognized. However, there are no ex-
plicit provisions for extra costs due to DG. There are plans to introduce incentive regu-
lation in 2009. DG has been listed as a potential cost driver to be considered in the DSO 
efficiency analysis.  
In Finland, DSOs should reduce OPEX by 1.3% per year (period 2005-2007), CAPEX 
are remunerated by applying a rate of return to the Replacement Value of the Network 
calculated at specific standard costs. Network reinforcements due to DG are taken into 
account in the calculation of CAPEX, in addition the possible change of network vol-
ume is also noticed in OPEX. 
In Italy, a RPI-X formula is applied to OPEX, CAPEX are remunerated at a rate of re-
turn. Incremental DSO costs due to the connection of DG are taken into account when 
DSO revenues are calculated. 
In Denmark a revenue cap applies for total DSO costs. The incremental effect of DG 
connections on DSO costs is not considered. The individual DSOs average tariffs are 
more or less fixed to the level they had in January 2004. 
In Netherlands, the allowed DSO revenues are calculated by a benchmark analysis ap-
plied to total costs TOTEX. In addition yardstick competition in terms of relative effi-
ciency among DSOs has been implemented. In the previous analysis, DG connections 
are not taken into account. If DG is larger than 10 MVA deep connection charges are 
applied, therefore the DG operator pays the necessary reinforcement costs. 
In Spain, a revenue cap formula applies to both OPEX and CAPEX. Therefore DSO 
revenues do not change due to DG connections. Because deep connection charges are 
applied, DG operators pay for network reinforcements. It is proposed a new revenue cap 
formula that takes into account annual incremental revenues due to new demands and 
new DG connections. The use of a reference network model is proposed to calculate 
these incremental revenues. 
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In UK, a revenue increment per each kW of connected DG has been added to the price 
cap formula. In addition, if a DG connection scheme qualifies as a Registered Power 
Zone (RPZ), the revenue increment is increased for the first five years of operation by 
£3/kW. RPZs are intended to encourage DSOs to develop and demonstrate new, more 
cost effective ways of connecting and operating generation that will deliver specific 
benefits to new distributed generators and broader benefits to consumers generally. 
In the following table, the current situation and some guidelines regarding the treatment 
of incremental OPEX and CAPEX due to DG are summarized. 
Table 6 Treatment of incremental OPEX & CAPEX due to DG 
Type of regulation  Countries Incremental OPEX & 
CAPEX due to DG 
Guidelines 
Rate of return or 
cost of service for 
both OPEX & 
CAPEX 
France, Ger-
many 
YES, however there are 
not explicit treatment of 
them 
Migrate to incen-
tive regulation. 
Rate of return for 
CAPEX. RPI-X for 
OPEX 
Finland, Italy Incremental CAPEX are 
explicitly included. There 
is not explicit treatment for 
incremental OPEX. 
Include specific 
treatment of in-
cremental OPEX. 
Incentive regulation: 
price or revenue 
caps 
Denmark, 
Netherlands, 
Austria, 
Spain 
NO.  
Incremental OPEX and 
CAPEX are not consid-
ered. 
Implement explicit 
mechanisms to 
take into account 
incremental costs 
due to DG. 
Incentive regulation 
plus ad-hoc explicit 
mechanisms 
UK YES.  
Incremental revenues as-
sociated to DG connec-
tions, and IFI and RPZ 
mechanisms. 
Evaluate and refine 
already imple-
mented mecha-
nisms. 
 
The current situation in the different EU countries regarding the treatment of incre-
mental costs due to DG is quite similar in all of them, with the exception of UK. It is 
clear that under incentive regulation based on price or revenue caps, if the level of DG 
penetration is increasing, a specific treatment of these incremental costs is required. We 
can find two different practical experiences. In the countries where rate of return regula-
tion is still in force, the incremental CAPEX are included in the Rate Asset Base (RAB). 
On the other hand, in countries with incentive regulation, only UK includes a specific 
revenue driver to consider such kind of incremental costs.  
DG-GRID: Guidelines for improvement network regulation for enhancing the share of DG 
34 
In the DG-GRID project, several regulatory options to compensate DSOs for incre-
mental costs due to DG have been investigated: 
• Allowance for DG in the Regulated Asset Base (RAB): In each price control 
process at the beginning of each regulatory period, a estimation on how the 
regulated asset base should be modified to include all the incremental CAPEX 
associated with new DG connections is calculated. At the end of the regulatory 
period the initial estimations will be reviewed according with real DG connec-
tions. This approach might not be the most effective and efficient one. In assess-
ing ‘estimations’, the questions on how bears the risk of under- or overestima-
tion of required network costs is important. Incorporation in CAPEX and OPEX 
estimates might be too complicated. 
• DSO benchmarking considering DG as a cost driver: In each price control proc-
ess, it is quite frequent that regulators carry out a benchmarking procedure that 
evaluates the efficiency of each individual DSOs apart from their cost bases. 
The results of the benchmarking procedure correct either the start value of the 
use-of-system tariffs and/or the tariffs during the regulatory period (“X-factor”). 
Due to the aforementioned impact of DG on DSO costs, it is clear that DG 
should be explicitly considered during the benchmarking process. One investi-
gated possibility is to include DG as another DSO cost driver. For instance, for 
OPEX the number of DG plants can be considered, while for CAPEX the DG 
feed-in capacity in peak load hours it is recommended. In addition, it has been 
proposed to define a performance indicator for DSOs associated with DG effi-
ciency; for instance, the DG contribution to the peak load substituting central-
ized generation capacity to supply the load. Regarding this last item, the issue is 
how DSOs can modify the production of controllable DG units, and what kind 
of active actions should be implemented for that (see DG support mechanisms 
and DG use-of-system charges in section 3 of this report. Time dependant pre-
miums on top of the electricity price and time-variable generator use-of-system 
charges can stimulate efficient feed-in of DG).  
• Tariff adjustment factor: Since it seems nearly impossible for a DSO to foresee 
the DG development in his network territory for a 3 to 5 year period, another 
regulatory option is to include secondly a possibility to recover the costs associ-
ated with DG ex post. This could mean an ex post recovery on a yearly basis or 
after the whole regulatory period. Formally this could be done through a balanc-
ing account that is included in the regulation formula through a Z-factor. 
• Allowance for a DSO revenue driver: the regulator may include in the DSO 
revenue formula, a DG-related increment revenue associated with DG con-
nected capacity and production on a yearly basis. This revenue driver should be 
calibrated to broadly reflect “average DSO” DG-attributable incremental costs, 
not allowed for by other incentives. For instance, 
 TARt = TARt-1(1 + CPI – X) + € A/ kWDG + € B/ MWhDG 
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Where: 
TARt: is the DSO total allowed revenue in year t  
CPI: is the consumer price index in year t  
X: is the efficiency factor set by the regulator according to a benchmarking 
analysis 
A: is an incremental DSO allowed revenue for each new kW of installed DG ca-
pacity connected to its network in year t  
B:  is an incremental DSO allowed revenue for each additional MWh produced 
by DG installations connected to its network in year t 
In the DG-GRID project some numerical analysis has been carried out to inves-
tigate different formulations of the revenue drivers under revenue cap regulation. 
It should be noted that the main difference between the tariff adjustment ap-
proach and the revenue driver one, is that under the first approach incremental 
costs are evaluated in each case and passed through ex post; while in the second 
case, standard costs are recognized ex ante for DG, no matter of particular situa-
tions.  
Finally, it is recommended that the specific regulatory compensation scheme should be 
designed taking into account the regulatory framework for distribution regulation in the 
country. Again, special importance has the regime for connection charges. Incremental 
investment costs are totally paid by DG under deep connection charges. Therefore that 
is not an incremental cost for DSOs. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that all 
the previous analysis and the following recommendations assume shallow connection 
charges for DG.  
R4. DSOs with high levels of DG penetration, defined as the energy generated by DG 
locally with respect to the local energy consumption, for instance higher than 15-20%, 
should be compensated for incremental CAPEX & OPEX due to DG, mainly because 
network investment and energy losses costs. There are several options to achieve this 
objective. In UK, a revenue increment per each kW of connected DG has been included 
in the DSOs remuneration. In addition, if a DG connection scheme qualifies as a Regis-
tered Power Zone (RPZ), the revenue increment is increased for the first five years of 
operation. DG-GRID project has investigated DSO revenue drivers based on the feed-in 
capacity and the energy delivered by DG modulated according the DG penetration lev-
els. Other options such as allowance for these extra costs in the Regulated Asset Base 
are more appropriate for rate of return regimes. It is recommended that the specific 
regulatory compensation mechanism should be designed taking into account the par-
ticular DSO regulatory framework in each country.  
Regulation level: National MS regulators. 
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2.2.3 DSO performance on energy losses  
As it has been evaluated in the DG-GRID project, energy losses in distribution networks 
are affected by DG. For low DG penetration levels usually DG would reduce network 
energy losses with respect the reference situation with no DG. On the other hand, high 
DG penetration levels would increase energy losses.  
The real economic impact of losses variations due to DG on DSO profits depends on 
how losses costs are considered in each particular DSO regulation.  
Among the European countries considered in the DG-GRID questionnaire, we can dis-
tinguish three different cases according the way losses energy reduction by DSOs is 
incentivized. 
There is a first group of countries where energy losses costs are not considered as a con-
trollable OPEX. In Austria, Finland, and Germany, DSOs are compensated for their 
actual losses, and they do not have incentives to reduce them. Therefore, the impact of 
DG on losses does not affect DSO profits. 
There is a second group of countries where DSOs has to compensate energy losses in 
their networks by buying that energy in the market. Losses costs are considered as con-
trollable OPEX. DSOs make more profits it they reduce losses in their networks. There-
fore, DSOs have an incentive to reduce losses. If the impact of DG in losses is not com-
pensated to the DSO, as it happens today, the economical consequences of higher or 
lower losses due to DG are totally assumed by DSOs. That is the case of DSOs in 
France, Italy, and Netherlands.  
In France, a predetermined level of losses is included in the provisions for the tariffs. 
Targets for reduction in non-technical losses ranging from 0.5% to 1.5%, depending on 
the concerned territory, have been considered. 
In Italy, DSOs have obligation quotas on energy to be saved. Therefore one way of 
achieving energy efficiency is by reducing network losses. On the other hand, DSOs 
have to compensate DG operators (except PV below 20 kW) for avoided transmission 
costs, i.e. the costs of purchasing electricity from the high voltage transmission network. 
In Netherlands, DSOs have to compensate energy losses by contracting energy from 
their own utility (if supplier and DSO belong to the same holding) or from other genera-
tors like DG. Therefore, DSOs have an incentive to reduce losses. Since 2006, DG op-
erators are credited for reducing energy losses on high voltage transmission levels 
through the feed-in of energy in lower voltage levels. The TSO determines the yearly 
amount devoted to these credits. 
Finally, there is a third group of countries, under incentive regulation, where DSOs have 
incentives to reduce losses below specific targets. If the impact of DG in losses is not 
considered by the regulator when calculating those targets, as it happens today, the eco-
nomical consequences of this impact are totally assumed by the DSOs. These countries 
are Denmark, Spain, and UK. 
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In Denmark, DSOs have incentive to reduce losses according to the cost caps, i.e. reve-
nue-cap regulation. 
In Spain, DSOs buy at the energy pool price the difference between actual energy losses 
in their networks and standard energy losses set by the regulator. 
In UK, each DSO has an incentive to decrease energy losses below a specific target. 
This target is calculated as an average of the DSO losses in previous years. 
There is a proposal in UK to take into account the impact of DG on DSO losses. An 
explicit adjustment to the level of reported DSO losses may be made to reflect the im-
pact of DG with a Loss Adjustment Factor (LAF) below 0.997. This adjustment will be 
the aggregate product of the difference between the site-specific LAF and 0.997, multi-
plied by the export volume of the generator. 
The following table summarizes the previous information and presents some guidelines 
for the future. 
Table 7 Impact of DG on DSO losses reduction incentives 
Incentives for 
losses reduction 
Countries Impact of DG on losses 
reduction incentives 
Guidelines 
DSOs are compen-
sated for actual en-
ergy losses. They do 
not have incentives 
Austria, 
Finland, Ger-
many 
Not considered. Migrate to imple-
ment incentives  
DSOs have to com-
pensate energy 
losses by buying 
them in the market. 
Losses cost is a con-
trollable OPEX. 
France, Italy, 
Netherlands 
The impact of DG on 
DSO losses cost has not 
been considered.  
DG is compensated for 
avoiding losses only in 
the transmission network 
(Italy, Netherlands). 
Compensate DSO 
for incremental 
losses due to DG. 
If due to DG, 
losses decrease, 
DSO can credit 
DG for such bene-
fit.  
DSOs have incen-
tives to reduce 
losses below spe-
cific targets. 
Denmark, 
Spain, UK 
The impact of DG on 
losses targets has not 
been considered. 
Include specific 
impact of DG on 
DSO losses targets. 
An example: pro-
posal in UK. 
 
With higher DG penetration or concentration levels on distribution networks, the impact 
of DG in network losses will be more important. To take this effect into account is a key 
issue for a better integration of DG. If this impact is not considered in the computation 
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of DSO losses costs or targets, as it happens today, the economical consequences of 
higher or lower losses due to DG will continue being assumed by the DSOs. To share 
the potential benefits or costs among DSOs and DG is important to design specific 
mechanisms that take into account this effect.  
For high DG penetration/concentration levels, an increase of revenues should be allo-
cated to compensate DSOs. For instance, in network areas with high DG penetration, a 
revenue driver to compensate the DSO in €/kWh associated with DG production (kWh) 
would be allocated. This compensation mainly will come from those generators con-
nected in those areas that would be charged with a fee (€/kWh) proportional to the value 
of the incremental losses they produce in the network, providing the correct locational 
signals.  
On the other hand, DG connected in lower voltage networks can be credited for losses 
reductions at higher voltage levels, that is the case of Italy and Netherlands. Again, this 
locational signal can be sent as a reduction of the use-of-system charges paid by DG, or 
by increasing the DG support as feed-in tariffs or premiums in lower voltage levels. 
Section 3 of this report provides guidelines for the implementation of these actions.  
R5. DSOs with distribution areas with high DG penetration/concentration levels could 
be compensated for incremental energy losses. For instance, a DSO revenue driver, in 
€/kWh, associated with DG production (kWh) located in those areas can be imple-
mented. This compensation would mainly come from those generators connected in 
those areas that would be charged with a fee (€/kWh) proportional to the value of the 
incremental losses they produce in the network.  
On the other hand, it is recommended to implement use-of-system charges for DG 
and/or support mechanisms applied to DG, differentiated by voltage levels, to take into 
account that DG connected in lower voltage networks can reduce losses at higher volt-
age levels. 
Regulation level: National MS regulators. 
 
2.2.4 DSO performance on quality of service 
Quality of service in distribution networks consists mainly of two topics: i) Continuity 
of supply associated with the frequency and duration of supply interruptions, and ii) 
voltage or power quality associated with voltage disturbances such as voltage changes, 
flicker, harmonics, voltage dips, etc. 
Continuity of supply is strongly related with DSO network investments and operational 
and maintenance expenses. Under incentive regulation, setting quality of service targets 
to DSOs has become a key issue to ensure adequate performance with efficient pricing. 
Otherwise, DSOs can increase their profits by reducing investments leading to a pro-
gressive degradation of the quality of service. 
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Half of the countries included in the DG-GRID WP4 questionnaire have already imple-
mented performance-based regulation to encourage DSOs to keep adequate quality of 
service levels. This performance based regulation is focused on the measurement and 
control of zonal reliability indices, SAIDI6 and SAIFI7. If DSOs achieve better actual 
values than those set as quality targets they will increase profits, otherwise profits will 
be reduced. 
How does DG affect to the quality of service provided by DSOs? This is still an open 
question.  
The capacity of DG to supply loads in islanding mode is a possibility that would in-
crease the continuity of supply provided by DSOs, however this is nowadays far from 
real DSO practices. How DG can be used to increase the continuity of supply provided 
by DSOs is a subject that needs further research and innovation efforts.  
In the following the country situation regarding this issue is reviewed. 
In Austria, continuity of supply indices, SAIDI and SAIFI are monitored, however there 
are no explicit incentives or penalties to DSO for meeting specific targets. DSOs can 
negotiate with DG for reactive power provision. 
In Denmark, no specific DSO regulation in terms of improving quality of service levels 
has been implemented yet. 
In Finland, DSOs are penalized if the interruption time of a single outage is longer than 
12 hours. In spite of that, there are plans to include in the next regulatory period (2008-
2011) performance regulation based on the value of the non-distributed energy to the 
customers. 
In France and Germany, there are not specific incentives/penalties related to quality of 
service targets. DG is mainly seen by DSOs as a potential source of quality problems. 
There are plans to implement a new performance based regulation for quality, however 
DG is not considered as a specific source for improvement. 
In Italy, performance regulation is based on a combination of technical standards and 
economic incentives. DG is not explicitly considered as a source of improvement. 
In Netherlands, incentives and penalties related to meet quality of service targets have 
been implemented. Total allowed DSO price increases depend on a quality indicator (Q-
factor). DSOs see DG units rather as a threat to their business than as an opportunity to 
diversify. 
In Spain, DSOs have to meet specific quality targets in terms of frequency and duration 
of supply interruptions. DG is not currently considered as a control element that can 
improve quality of service levels. 
                                                 
6 SAIDI stands for System Average Interruption Duration Index. 
7 SAIFI stands for System Average Interruption Frequency Index. 
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In UK, penalties and rewards have been implemented for DSOs associated with conti-
nuity of supply indices. The most extended opinion is that DG neither improves nor 
reduces the continuity of supply figures. A radical change in the design of protection 
systems in distribution networks is required in order to DG can help improving quality 
of service indicators. 
The following table summarizes the current situation and guidelines regarding DSO 
quality of service performance and the role of DG.  
Table 8 Impact of DG on DSO quality of service obligations and incentives 
Incentives/penalties 
to meet quality of 
service targets 
Countries Contribution of DG to 
quality of service lev-
els 
Guidelines 
DSOs have not in-
centives/penalties 
Austria, 
Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany 
Neutral.  
Most of DSOs see DG 
as a potential problem 
rather as a control 
source. 
Implement incen-
tives for quality of 
service improve-
ments. 
Performance based 
regulation for qual-
ity of service  
Italy, Nether-
lands, Spain, 
UK 
Neutral.  
Most of DSOs see DG 
as a potential problem 
rather as a control 
source. 
Implement specific 
innovation actions 
to integrate DG as 
a control source for 
improving quality 
of service levels. 
 
Concerning voltage quality, the European standard EN – 50.1608 establishes the voltage 
characteristics that should be met by DSOs when supplying electricity to users con-
nected to distribution networks. 
As a conclusion, most of the countries have already or have plans to implement per-
formance based regulation for quality of service levels. Currently, DG is seen by most 
of DSOs as a potential source of problems rather than a help for network management 
and quality improvement. That is mainly due to the lack of observability and controlla-
bility of these sources, together with their frequent disconnections in case of network 
disturbances. However, if DG penetration levels increase as it is foreseen, the potential 
advantages of having DG as a new control source should become a DSO opportunity 
instead of a threat. DG can help to improve reliability indices working in islanding 
mode in case of network outages. DG can provide ancillary services such as voltage 
                                                 
8 European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC), 'Voltage characteristics of  
eletricity supplied by public distribution systems, European Norm EN 50160', November 1994. 
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control, frequency reserve, or black start to improve voltage quality. However, to 
achieve this aim, a deep DSO transformation from passive to active management is 
needed. Regulators should include incentives for specific innovation actions taken by 
DSOs in this direction. See also recommendation 7 in next section 
Finally, quality of service targets currently required to DSOs to be met for consumers in 
their connection points should be extended for distributed generators connected to dis-
tribution networks. Distributed generators and electricity consumers should be both 
considered network users with the same rights and requirements in terms of quality of 
service levels.  
 
R6. DSOs have to meet quality of service targets in terms of i) duration and frequency 
of supply interruptions, and ii) voltage quality keeping voltage disturbances within cer-
tain limits. The potential advantages of having DG as a new control source should be-
come a DSO opportunity instead of a threat. DG can help to improve reliability indices 
working in islanding mode in case of network outages. DG can provide ancillary ser-
vices such as voltage control, frequency reserve, or black start to improve voltage qual-
ity. To achieve this aim, it is recommended to implement  
- performance based regulation for quality of service targets that provides 
explicit incentives to DSOs for improving quality of service levels  
- incentives for DSO innovation programs that promote a deep transfor-
mation from passive to active management increasing DG participation 
in network control and DG contribution in case of network disturbances. 
- incentives to DG for providing ancillary services to help DSOs to oper-
ate the network, for instance, providing voltage control and reactive 
power support, frequency reserve, islanding operation, etc. to improve 
quality of service levels.  
Regulation level: National MS regulators.  
2.3 DSO incentives for innovation 
The EU-15 survey carried out in the WP1 of DG-GRID has shown that current regula-
tion of DSOs lack of mechanisms to promote network innovation. DG integration poses 
on DSOs new challenges on network planning, operation, and control to be cost effec-
tive. DSO regulated business are risk adverse to make investments on new technologies 
that are not enough mature. Even more, incentive regulation mostly promotes cost and 
investment reductions.  Therefore, network regulation should provide additional tailor-
made instruments for DSOs to get involved in R&D and take the risk to try out new 
approaches for network innovations to accommodate a rising share of DG. 
The country questionnaires completed in DG-GRID WP4 concluded that most of the 
DG-GRID countries, but UK, has not implemented explicit incentives for DSO innova-
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tion yet. Some of them think that current DSO regulation towards economic efficiency 
and quality of service improvements will bring, in an indirect way, innovation. Few 
countries have incorporated innovative designs in the support mechanisms for DG or in 
the DG use-of-system charges to achieve a more effective integration of DG. 
The country situation on this issue is as follows. 
In Austria no explicit incentives for innovation have been implemented. The controlla-
bility of DG should increase as a requirement for better integration. An idea could be to 
allow DSOs dispatch DG, e.g. biomass plants, during 10% of the year, compensating 
DG-IPP by raising their feed-in tariff in a specific percentage. 
In Denmark, current incentive regulation provides incentives to DSOs to be more effec-
tive. The benchmark analysis conducted by the regulator aims to determine the potential 
for a more effective way of running the DSOs. 
In Finland, according to the plan during the next regulatory period, DSOs would have 
incentives to improve quality of service. This will bring opportunities for innovation. 
DG use of system charges are differentiated typically from two to four time zones. 
In France, the obligation to connect DG together with incentive based regulation for 
quality should be, in the opinion of the regulator, the main driver for DSO innovation. 
Controllable and hydro DG get a premium for the guaranteed generation capacity they 
offer to the system in winter periods. 
In Germany, there are not incentives for DSO innovation, neither innovative price sig-
nals for DG integration. 
In Italy, innovation is associated with the obligations imposed to DSOs to improve en-
ergy efficiency and to connect DG within sort delays. DG is compensated by DSOs for 
avoided costs of purchasing electricity to TSO. This compensation or DG credits are 
differentiated in four time zones (peak, two intermediates, and base load). 
In Netherlands, there is a DSO platform for research with limited results until now. In 
opinion of the regulator, innovation is part of the regular DSO business. Time-
dependent premiums and tariffs seem to be a good solution. However, the DSO admin-
istrative burden with the cost of communication infrastructures would increase signifi-
cantly.  
In Spain, there are not specific incentives for DSO innovation. DG larger than 5 MW 
can participate in the electricity market receiving market price signals plus a constant 
premium. 
In UK, there are two different mechanisms to promote DSO innovation. The Innovation 
Funding Incentive (IFI) for projects focused on the technical development of distribu-
tion networks. The Registered Power Zones (RPZ) to develop more effective ways of 
connecting and operating DG. Currently DG pay use of system charges, but these 
charges do not give signals considering the potential benefit from DG on network losses 
or flow reduction. 
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The following table summarizes the current situation and provides some guidelines to 
improve it regarding DSO innovation and DG integration. 
Table 9 Incentives for DSO innovation 
Incentives for DSO in-
novation  
Countries Guidelines 
No incentives Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Spain 
Implement incentives for im-
proving DSO performance. 
Implicit incentives associ-
ated to performance based 
regulation  
Denmark, Italy, 
Netherlands 
Critical review of current situa-
tion. Performance based regula-
tion is bringing DSO innova-
tion? 
Explicit incentives UK Validate and tune current inno-
vation schemes. 
 
As a conclusion, the main open question today is if performance based-regulation is 
bringing innovation by it-self or not? The UK is the only country that has included ex-
plicit incentives to DSO innovation, the rest of the countries have not really thought 
about it. Our recommendation is to complement performance-based regulation with 
explicit incentives for DSO innovation.. 
 
In the DG-GRID project two different and complementary approaches for network in-
novation have been investigated. First, some recommendations on short-term regulatory 
measures that can be implemented in combination with current DSO incentive regula-
tion were made. Second, a long-term regulatory vision on how deeper network trans-
formations will favour migration from a centralized to a decentralized network para-
digm was envisaged.  
2.3.1 Network innovations to integrate DG  
There are several regulatory mechanisms to promote innovation in line with incentive 
regulation. In DG-GRID WP2 the following ones were analyzed. 
• Input incentives: R&D investment and costs can be included in the RAB as a 
separate item with higher rates of return or with a partial pass-through that re-
duces the risk perceived by DSOs. In addition, the regulatory period to pass-
through associated gains of efficiency derived from such innovations to custom-
ers, should be extended.  
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An example of a partial pass-through approach is the Innovation Funding Incen-
tive (IFI) in UK. IFI projects can embrace any aspect of distribution system as-
set management from design through to construction, commissioning, operation, 
maintenance and decommissioning. A DSO is allowed to spend up to 0.5% of 
its Combined Distribution Network Revenue on eligible IFI projects. 
• Output incentives: the regulator selects one or several performance indicators 
that can be significantly improved through network innovation. In general, 
DSOs may obtain incentives if they improve the quality of supply and reduce 
energy losses. In order to foster DG integration through innovation, specific per-
formance indicators with associated economic incentives if DSOs reach specific 
targets, should be selected. One of these indicators could be the number of DG 
connections already integrated in the network with respect the total number of 
applications submitted to the DSO.  
An example of this type of incentives for innovation is the Registered Power 
Zones (RPZ) in UK. RPZs are focused specifically on the connection of genera-
tion to distribution systems. RPZs are intended to encourage DSOs to develop 
and demonstrate new, more cost effective ways of connecting and operating 
generation that will deliver specific benefits to new distributed generators and 
broader benefits to consumers generally. If the regulator accepts a specific pro-
posal as RPZ, the incentive element of the DG Incentive is increased for the first 
five years of operation by £3/kW (€ 4.5/kW).  
On the other hand, input or output instruments as the ones previously described require 
evaluation by external experts in the small electricity sector world that can become a 
critical aspect for the success of this kind of instrument. 
Another important driver for DSO innovation could be the design of more market-
conform instruments like time-variable feed-in premiums on top of the energy price that 
make more system valuable generation at peak and valley hours; or time-variable use-
of-system tariffs for generators connected to distribution networks that improve effi-
ciency in network utilization and help to postpone network investments (see DG support 
mechanisms and DG use-of-system charges in section 3 of this report). Regarding inno-
vative designs of price signals to integrate DG is interesting to mention the previously 
commented experiences of DG market integration in Spain, DG use-of-system charges 
with time discrimination in Finland, and DG credits in France and Italy. 
 
2.3.2 Long-term network transformation 
A large scale penetration of DG into the distribution networks will impose significant 
challenges to the network operation and development. DG penetration is changing the 
distribution paradigm from a central control philosophy to a distributed control. This 
makes it necessary to rethink network regulation as a whole, rather than merely solving 
specific regulatory problems. In order to promote a long-term transformation of the 
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network, the regulatory process needs to be complemented by instruments that go be-
yond one regulatory period, enable the regulatory process to deal with future structural 
changes and future uncertainty and provide coordination mechanisms for the stake-
holders involved (network and plant operators, technology developers etc.) 
In the DG-GRID project, two instruments that could help deal with the uncertainty of 
future system transformation have been analyzed:  
 Developing long-term visions through regulatory scenarios, and  
 Experimentation with new regulatory instruments. 
 
R7. Incentives to promote DSO innovation for efficient integration of DG should be 
incorporated into network regulation. Some of the instruments to implement them can 
be: 
- R&D investments can be included in the Regulated Asset Base as a separate 
item with higher rates of return or with a partial pass-through. An example is 
the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) in UK. A DSO is allowed to spend up to 
0.5% of its revenue on eligible IFI projects. 
- Selection of performance indicators that can be improved through network in-
novation. Several countries have implemented performance regulation to im-
prove quality of supply. 
- Regulators may work with DSOs formulating and testing new regulatory instru-
ments, and developing new regulatory scenarios with a shared vision, in order 
to explore deeper and long-term network transformations. 
The selection of the most appropriate instruments in each country would take into 
account the type of DSO incentive regulation in place and the national regulatory 
framework.  
Regulation level: National MS Regulators. 
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3 Enhancing DG network integration 
In this section, guidelines and recommendations are provided regarding what efficient 
economic signals should be given to DG units in order to achieve their effective net-
work integration. First, it is analyzed if current DG support mechanisms provide an 
economic incentive to DG in order to operate minimizing incremental costs to the sys-
tem. Second, efficient designs of DG connection charges and use-of system charges are 
recommended. Finally, different ancillary and other network services that can be sup-
plied by DG are reviewed and some recommendations for efficient procurement are 
presented. 
3.1 DG support mechanisms 
A lot of DG technologies have not reached a mature state of development yet to com-
pete against electricity produced from conventional thermal technologies or nuclear 
power. The EU adopted Directive 2001/77/EC and Directive 2004/8/EC on support 
schemes for electricity generated from renewable energy sources (RES-E) and from 
combined heat and power (CHP), respectively. Member States may adopt support 
mechanisms at the national level to promote RES-E and CHP, thereby taking account of 
national circumstances. The support mechanisms differ between the Member States and 
for the different technologies even within a Member State. This allows the Member 
States to consider their fuel mix, generation potential, and the stage of market develop-
ment of the individual technologies. E.g., Denmark applies a price premium for onshore 
wind power, a feed-in tariff for solid biomass and biogas, and an annual subsidy or pri-
oritised production for small-scale CHP based on natural gas and waste.  
There are two main kinds of support schemes: market-based policies where the quantity 
is set by the regulator, such as renewable quota obligation, and price-based mechanisms, 
such as feed-in tariffs and price premiums on top of the spot price of electricity.  
The most frequently applied support scheme in the EU-15 is the feed-in tariff (Skytte, 
Ropenus et al. 2005, p. 86), which has proven very effective for the deployment of wind 
energy9. 
Feed-in tariffs provide a lot of investment certainty and high ecological effectiveness 
and are therefore well suited to promote immature technologies. However, with an in-
creasing share of DG, feed-in tariffs may become problematic as the production quan-
tity is set according to the tariff level and independent of the actual demand for power 
(Skytte, Ropenus et al. 2005, p. 84). When technologies become more mature, a move 
towards more market-based policies (price premium, tradable green certificate market) 
may improve economic efficiency and enhance compatibility with liberalisation. Trad-
                                                 
9 For a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of support mechanisms, see COM(2005) 627 final. With 
regard to the DG Grid project, not all RES-E is DG, e.g., a large offshore wind farm or large hydro-
power units would not fall under the definition of DG. 
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able green certificate markets further economic efficiency, but also expose DG opera-
tors to a higher risk inherent to the volatility of the spot and the certificate price. This 
may lead to an exclusion of technologies that have not reached the necessary level of 
maturity yet.  
At the same time, if deployed effectively, DG may exhibit characteristics of a public 
good, such as low negative environmental externalities compared to conventional ther-
mal generation, the avoidance/deferral of network expansions, the contribution to local 
security of supply, reliability and reserve capacity. These public values are not included 
in the market price and may legitimatise support for DG. The question is how to strike 
the balance between economic efficiency (including market compatibility) and the pro-
vision of sufficient support to promote DG.  
According to the requirements of Directive 2001/77/EC, Art.4, at the end of 2005, the 
Commission released a Communication on the support of electricity from renewable 
energy sources (COM(2005) 627 final). Therein, it concludes that competing national 
schemes could be regarded as healthy at least over a transitional period and envisages a 
co-ordinated approach to support schemes for RES-E based on cooperation between 
countries and optimisation of the impact of national schemes. This also allows for sub-
harmonisation of Member States with systems with a sufficient degree of similarity (cf. 
ibid, p. 16). 
In line with the Communication of the Commission (COM(2005) 627 final), national 
support mechanisms will be maintained at least during the transitional period and they 
will be fine-tuned at the national level. With higher shares of DG, support mechanisms 
should be adapted to become more compatible with market price signals in order to 
achieve a higher level of DG market integration. 
In electricity markets, conventional generators receive two main price signals: energy 
hourly prices and network use-of-system (UoS) charges. Energy prices reflect the op-
portunity cost of the hourly generated energy. It is clear that the operation of controlla-
ble generators should be linked to this signal. Generation production is most system 
valuable at higher price hours. On the other hand, use-of-system charges paid by gen-
erators reflect the network incremental costs that generators are responsible for. These 
costs are usually differentiated by time of use and network location. However in some 
countries such as France, Germany, and Spain, generators do not pay use-of-system 
charges.  
As conventional generation, to promote efficiency in the system, DG should be exposed 
to the same kind of economic signals, independent of the selected support mechanism. 
For instance, if DG only receives as incomes a flat feed-in tariff without time or location 
differentiation components, the economic efficiency signals regarding DG operation and 
location in the system are lost. 
One step further, support mechanisms like the feed-in premium system can be designed 
in order to maximize the social value of generation production. The current practice is 
that an eligible wind generator gets his premium on top of the commodity price irre-
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spective of the point in time he feeds in his production. The social value of this produc-
tion is very time-variable though. At system peak demand, his contribution will in the 
margin substitute inefficient, highly polluting (including GHG emissions) peaking 
power technologies. Also depending on the way wind power facilities are operated its 
capacity credit can increase and it can replace/postpone more investment in fossil-fuel 
or nuclear based technologies. Moreover, T&D losses can be reduced. However, wind 
power feed-in at rated capacity on a quiet early Sunday morning can pose quite some 
operational challenges to TSOs/DSOs. For example, base-load coal technology plants 
might be forced to ramp down at reduced energy efficiency and concurrent negative 
environmental impacts. With current feed-in premium regulations for eligible genera-
tors, no generator is incentivised to give any attention to improving the social value of 
his feed-in by timing. If the premium were negligible when the electricity price would 
be low, it might become interesting for him to provide certain ancillary services such as 
possibly (conditional) secondary frequency response (at a certain modest compensa-
tion).  
Most of the DG-GRID countries have implemented feed-in tariffs or premiums as the 
major support mechanism to promote DG based on RES or CHP. 
The current situation by country is as follows. 
In Austria feed-in tariffs are differentiated by DG technologies and size, not by voltage 
levels, nor by time of use. Within the framework of the green electricity scheme, DG 
generally enjoys ‘priority dispatch’. 
In Denmark, price premium is the selected support mechanism. 
In Finland, support for investment (up to 40%) and exemption from taxes of generated 
electricity are the main support mechanisms. 
In France, feed-in tariffs are differentiated by DG technology, size and time of use for 
some hydro and controllable DG. Feed-in tariffs and purchase obligations are discon-
nected from market prices. Some specific contracts consider the possibility of dispatch-
ing the DG plant, and/or additional remuneration for guaranteed capacity in winter. 
In Germany, feed-in tariffs for renewable are differentiated by technology and vintage. 
For other DG, implicit differentiation by network area/level due to the payment to DG 
of avoided network costs has been implemented. This gives incentives to generate dur-
ing network peak hours, provided the DSO supplies the necessary information. For 
CHP, the support is a premium plus the market price. There are not clear procedures to 
control DG outputs in case of network constraints. 
In Italy, a RES-E quota obligation system has been implemented. Only photovoltaic 
small plants are remunerated through feed-in tariffs. They receive higher remuneration 
at peak hours.  
In Netherlands, feed-in premiums are differentiated by technologies and in some in-
stances by size but not by time-of-use. This support scheme has been suspended since 
August 2006 for new applicants. 
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In Spain, DG can select between two options: i) constant feed-in tariffs, or ii) fixed 
premium on top of the market price plus an incentive. These differ by technology and 
size. However there is not differentiation by network voltages or time-of-use. 56% of 
total DG is under the premium option, that includes 96% of the total wind installed ca-
pacity. DG under the premium option has the same obligations as conventional genera-
tors regarding daily production programs and energy unbalances. Aggregation of small 
generators is allowed to minimize program unbalances. 
In UK, a quota system has been implemented. Next regulation will include the possibil-
ity of aggregators to act fully on behalf of small generators. 
The following table summarizes the current situation and provides some comments and 
guidelines to improve DG integration regarding actual support mechanisms. 
Table 10 Compatibility between DG support mechanisms and DG efficient market 
and network integration 
DG support mechanism  Countries Comments & Guidelines 
Feed-in tariffs Austria, France, 
Germany, Spain 
This is adequate only for renew-
able small generators. 
Feed-in tariffs with time 
of use and/or voltage level 
differentiation 
France, Germany  This is adequate for renewable 
and controllable medium and 
small generators 
Feed-in premiums  Denmark, Nether-
lands, Spain 
This is adequate to achieve DG 
market integration. It is recom-
mended to include network sig-
nals through DG use-of-system 
charges or DG credits differenti-
ated by voltage levels or areas. 
Quota Italy, UK DG market and network integra-
tion is not affected by the sup-
port mechanism. 
Incentives for investment 
and taxes exemption 
Finland DG market and network integra-
tion is not affected by the sup-
port mechanism. 
 
As a conclusion, feed-in tariffs and, a least extent, feed-in premiums, should be made 
more compatible with market prices and efficient network use-of-system charges in 
order to maximize the system value of DG production. Given the quite high premium 
levels offered to certain DER generators, the latter will be very reluctant to agree to re-
strictions on their mode of operation because of network considerations. Generally, 
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DER-based generators benefiting from high premiums will be rather unresponsive to 
market and grid conditions 
Different alternatives can be adopted to improve current practices, for instance: 
- Constant feed-in tariffs should be avoided as a general rule. They can be justi-
fied in terms of learning curves and risk reduction. They have their role to play 
as an effective instrument to develop new technologies without controllability . 
capacity. For instance, they can be justified for small renewable generators, 
such as PV or wind, where it is assumed no operation control would be imple-
mented. 
- Feed-in tariffs with time of use discrimination that promote energy production 
at peak hours and do not provide incentives for production at valley hours are 
more appropriate for medium size and controllable DG where storage and con-
trollability capabilities can be more easily justified. 
- Feed-in premiums on top of market price is a better signal for DG market inte-
gration. In addition it has been proposed to make feed-in premiums time de-
pendent. For instance, a premium dependent on the average power price of a 
relevant day-ahead market for short time intervals e.g. 15 minutes.  
- Finally, support mechanisms decoupled from market signals, such as quotas or 
incentives to investments, are very appropriate for a good market integration, 
because in each hour the DG incomes are mainly determined by its market par-
ticipation as conventional generators.  
 
R8. DG (RES/CHP) support mechanisms, especially with high DG shares, should be 
made compatible with energy market prices and network UoS tariffs that promote effi-
cient DG operation and network location. Regarding DG operation to achieve efficient 
market integration it is recommended: 
- RES-E and CHP market stimulation systems should be smartened to better re-
flect the social value of the MWh injected in the system. In case of high DG 
penetration, avoid fixed production payment mechanisms, such as constant feed-
in tariffs or feed-in subsidies as a general rule. 
- Implement feed-in tariffs with time discrimination or feed-in premiums on top of 
market prices that promote efficient DG operation, i.e. higher production at 
peak hours, and storage and controllability capabilities in medium and large 
size DG installations. 
Regulation level: National MS Governments/Regulators   
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3.2 Connection charges 
Fair and non-discriminatory network access is one of the main requirements for an in-
crease in distributed generation. New network users have to pay a charge to obtain a 
connection to the existing network. Three different kinds of connection charges can be 
distinguished: shallow, deep and shallowish charges. Shallow connection charges en-
compass only the direct costs of connecting the DG producer to the nearest point in the 
distribution network. Additional costs for network reinforcements and upgrades are so-
cialized among the grid users and paid through the use-of-system charges. By contrast, 
deep connection charges imply that all the costs for network reinforcements both at the 
transmission and distribution level have to be borne by the DG producer. Shallowish or 
mixed connection charges constitute a hybrid of the two former approaches: they in-
clude direct connection costs and costs for reinforcements at the distribution level, but 
only the proportional use of that. 
The connection charging approach can be of great relevance for DG producers trying to 
penetrate the market. There is a trade-off between providing incentives for the optimal 
and cost-reflective siting of new generation capacity (deep connection charges) and fa-
cilitating entry for small-sized DG operators (shallow connection charges) for whom 
these charges may otherwise present substantial capital costs.  
DG usually should have priority access to the network for reasons of investment secu-
rity, low transaction costs and the acknowledgement of DG system benefits. Shallow 
connection charges seem to be the best economic signal for DG integration in order to i) 
keep the barriers to entry as low as possible, ii) keep the calculation simple and trans-
parent, and iii) lower transaction costs to DG promoters. However, shallow connection 
charges may seem less attractive for DSOs, especially if there is not a clear mechanism 
to recover network reinforcements associated to DG connections. In this case, costs for 
possible network reinforcements and upgrades should be socialised among the network 
users and paid through the Use of System (UoS) charges10. This recommendation was 
also supported as a conclusion in the previous European project SUSTELNET11. 
In order to promote DG integration with transparent and simple rules, avoiding negotia-
tions with DSOs, shallow connection charges paid just once when the connection is re-
quired, are recommended. Other network reinforcements to accommodate DG should be 
covered by DSOs and collected through use of system tariffs. In addition, for higher DG 
penetration/concentration levels, DSO should be able to give a location signal to DG 
developers through an adequate design of UoS charges, see recommendation R10. 
                                                 
10 Use of system (UoS) charges are intended to recover network transport and system services. They are 
periodically paid by network users as capacity and/or energy charges. 
11 M.J.J. Scheepers, 'Policy and Regulatory Roadmaps for the Integration of Distributed Generation and 
the Development of Sustainable Electricity Networks', Final Report of the SUSTELNET project, ECN 
Report ECN-C-04-034, 2004, NL. 
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Most of the DG-GRID countries apply DG shallow connection charges. However, some 
of them still maintain deep connection charges. 
The current situation per country is as follows. 
In Austria, shallow charges plus, in some regions, lump sums are applied. The latter 
being partly subject to negotiation between DSO and DG. In opinion of the regulator, 
the connection charging rules are clear. Few conflicts have been evident to the public.  
In Denmark, negotiated shallow charges are applied by DSOs. Published tariffs should 
be notified to the regulator. 
In Finland, connection charges are determined and applied by DSOs. Differences on 
charges can be high depending on size and location of DG. Since January 2008, DG will 
pay shallow costs. DG will pay only the network that is used for its connection to the 
network. All the customers will pay possible network reinforcement. 
In France, DG only pays for the connection line and/or transformer upgrading. The rest 
of reinforcements are included in the tariff for public grid use. 
In Germany, DSOs apply non regulated shallow charges to DG. They will be regulated 
in the future. 
In Italy, the network upgrading costs are shared among the DSO and the DG by negotia-
tion. Any general upgrading must be charged to the DSO. Small generators do not pay 
network investment, but they are charged a predetermined amount by DSOs as a man-
agement cost. 
In Netherlands, for DG below 10 MVA connection charges are shallow, regulated and 
averaged. On the other hand, DG larger than 10 MVA pay deep and negotiated with the 
DSO connection charges. Wind farm project developers typically have to negotiate hard 
and over long periods before reaching a final agreement with DSOs on connection 
charges. 
In Spain, connection charges are deep. Rules and negotiations are not transparent. Some 
conflict cases among DG and DSOs have been reported.  
In UK, shallowish charges are applied. It is a kind of hybrid between shallow and deep 
charges. The generator covers the direct connection installations (shallow) and only the 
proportional use of new reinforcements in the existing network. Some argue that still 
this method constitutes a barrier for DG network access.  
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Table 11 Connection charges for DG 
Connection 
charges for DG 
Countries Structure of connec-
tion charges 
Guidelines 
Deep charges Finland, 
Netherlands 
(>10 MVA), 
Spain 
Negotiated between 
DSO and DG 
Implement shallow 
charging. 
Shallowish charges UK Negotiated between 
DSO and DG 
Evolve to regu-
lated charges. 
Shallow charges Austria, 
Denmark, 
Finland (in 
2008), France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands 
(<10 MVA) 
Mostly negotiated be-
tween DSO and DG. 
Regulated for small 
generators in Italy, and 
Netherlands 
Evolve to regu-
lated charges. 
 
Most of the countries apply negotiated shallow charges for the connection of DG. There 
is still a lack of transparency in the calculation methods for connection charges (see 
ELEP report on connection charges, http://www.elep.net/). The two main recommenda-
tions are i) for those countries that still apply DG deep connection charges migrate to 
shallow connection charges, and ii) for those countries that apply DG negotiated shal-
low connection charges evolve to simple and transparent rules to calculate regulated 
shallow charges.  
 
R9. To create a level playing field for DG integration, DG connection charges, paid 
just once when the connection is required, should be regulated, based on simple rules 
mainly recognizing shallow costs, i.e. the direct costs of connection. Calculation rules 
should be transparent and standardized by national regulation. Other costs for network 
reinforcements and upgrades due to DG connections should be socialised among the 
network users and paid through the Use of System (UoS) charges. 
Regulation level: National MS Regulators. 
3.3 Use of system charges 
DSO allowed revenues are recovered through use-of-system (UoS) charges paid by 
network users, usually end consumers, and, in some MS, generators connected to the 
distribution network. UoS charges should, as far as possible, (i) reflect the cost incurred 
to provide the network user with the network transport and system service, and (ii) en-
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sure full recovery of the DSO’s total acknowledged revenues. UoS charges for end users 
typically include a component proportional to the energy demand, in euros/kWh, and a 
component proportional to the peak demand, in euros/kW-year. They are usually differ-
entiated by network voltage levels and time of use: peak, flat, and valley hours.  
As DG penetration levels increase, regulators should implement network locational and 
time of use charges that promote efficient connection and operation of DG units.  
When implementing UoS charges, locational differentiation can take into account net-
work voltage levels. In a more sophisticated scheme, they can be differentiated by DG 
penetration and concentration levels for rural and urban networks. Regarding differen-
tiation for network voltage levels, it is clear that the connection of DG to lower voltage 
levels would bring more benefits to the system in terms of losses and delaying system 
reinforcements than the connection to higher voltage levels. As an example, in the 
Czech Republic, in addition to the feed-in tariffs, a compensation system for DG 
(RES/CHP) based on bonus per injected kWh has been implemented. The bonus is 
higher for DG connections at low voltage networks, and gradually decreases for connec-
tions to medium and high voltage networks. These bonuses can be understood as nega-
tive UoS charges for DG. This is an example of how the support mechanism can be 
used to achieve the same effect as a cost reflective design of a DG UoS charge. 
Time of use differentiation should promote higher production at local peak demand 
hours in order to match locally generation and demand. Time-variable UoS charges 
could encourage more focus on bringing down network utilization and losses at peak 
load times, i.e. when the network is used most intensively and therefore would have a 
tendency to increase line losses (line losses are proportional to the square of the load).  
According to DG-GRID WP4 questionnaire, most of the countries have implemented 
UoS charges for DG. Among the countries with UoS charging, some use a uniform 
charging, while others differentiate between voltage levels, DG size, time of use and 
location. 
In the following the country situation regarding this issue is reviewed. 
In Austria and Denmark there are UoS charging mechanisms. UoS charges in Austria 
are used to compensate for secondary balancing on a kWh dispatched basis. 
In Finland, DSOs determine the UoS charges freely, with a cap of 0.7€/MWh. The UoS 
charges are including usually constant component [€/month], energy dependent compo-
nent [€/MWh], and power based component [€/kW, €/kvar], input energy to network 
and in some DSO’s also consumption of own production are charged. Charges are de-
pendent on voltage level [≤1 kV, 6-70 kV and ≥110 kV] and DG sizes. The energy rates 
differ depending on the time of day and/or the time of year. The charges are defined by 
DSOs and there are large variations between DSOs.  
In France, Germany and Spain there are no UoS charging mechanisms for DG. In Spain 
Conventional and distributed generators do not pay UoS charges by law, only demands 
pay UoS charges. There is no prevision to change this rule in the short term.  
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In Italy, UoS charges are combined wit the losses reduction remuneration for DG. These 
charges are set for small DG in 120€/year (mainly management cost) plus 0.5% of the 
value of energy with a cap on the whole year payment. 
In The Netherlands, DG-operators are obliged to pay uniform UoS charges for system 
services according to the amount of net energy taken from the network. These charges 
cover reserve requirements, black-out arrangements and costs related with the mainte-
nance of system stability, among others. 
In UK, UoS charges are defined for EHV customers and negotiated with the DSO. 
These charges include transport services and metering, and depend on the location of 
the DG power plant. 
The following table summarizes the current situation and guidelines regarding UoS 
charges for DG.  
Table 12 UoS charges for DG 
UoS charges for 
DG 
Countries Structure of UoS 
charges 
Guidelines 
DG operators have 
no UoS charges 
France, 
Germany, Spain 
Not considered Implement UoS 
charging mecha-
nisms. 
DG operators have 
uniform UoS 
charges 
Austria, Den-
mark, Italy, The 
Netherlands 
No distinction Structure UoS 
charges, according 
to voltage levels, 
DG size, and 
power plant loca-
tion. 
DG operators have 
specific UoS 
charges  
Finland, UK Voltage level, DG size, 
time of use. 
Evaluate the effi-
ciency of this cost 
mechanism. 
 
As a conclusion, most of the countries have already UoS charging mechanism, although 
most of them have the uniform charging option. In general, there are no plans to modify 
this situation. UoS charging mechanisms are very important to reflect the cost of the 
service, including a differentiation of the voltage level, location, and time of use. To 
improve economic signals sent to the DG-operators regarding their contribution to the 
system cost, specific UoS charges should be designed and implemented. 
R10. To promote a more efficient integration of DG, it is recommended that DG pay or 
receive UoS charges. DG use of system charges should be cost reflective (positive or 
negative). To achieve that some recommendations are: 
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- DG UoS charges should be differentiated by time of use and voltage levels. DG 
connections at lower voltage levels and DG production at load peak hours 
should be incentivized.  
- Differentiated DG support mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs by voltage levels 
can be used to achieve the same effect that differentiated DG UoS charges.  
- DG UoS charges calculation methods should be in line with the other elements 
of the national regulatory framework: DG connection charges, DG support 
mechanisms, DG network services, etc.  
Regulation level: National MS Regulators. 
 
3.4 DG ancillary and other network services 
DG units can provide DSO ancillary services and other network services that can lead to 
a more economic efficient system. For instance, a more flexible operation of controlla-
ble DG according to network price signals can save investment or delay network rein-
forcement and network automation facilities. In addition, if islanded operation is im-
plemented, DG can reduce the impact of network outages on customer supply interrup-
tions, improving quality of service indicators. Moreover, controllable DG under local 
control or following system operation orders can provide local voltage support or flow 
control when needed by the DSO. 
To achieve these advantages from DG, what is needed is an important change in the 
relationships between DG and DSOs. For instance, DSOs should be entitled to enter 
into agreements with DG to regulate under certain transparent conditions the active 
power feed-in at agreed financial compensations. That should be also acknowledged by 
DSO regulation that should allow DSOs to make an optimal choice between reinforcing 
the network, high CAPEX, and active network management (lower CAPEX and higher 
OPEX). Moreover, DSOs should be able to purchase ancillary services from DG, such 
as voltage and reactive support, energy losses, or congestion management. 
Different levels of participation in the provision of Ancillary Services (AS) can be 
found among the countries included in the DG-GRID WP4 questionnaire. Reactive 
power control and energy balancing are the AS usually procured by DG. 
In the following the country situation regarding this issue is reviewed. 
In Austria, DG is not allowed to receive incentives from the AS. Anyway, certain con-
tributions of DG - e.g. seasonally split power factors - are usually negotiated and can be 
expected to make it more likely that DSOs embrace the connection of DG and hence 
ease integration procedures.  
In Denmark, DG is allowed to participate into AS but in practice there is no real contri-
bution.  
DG-GRID: Guidelines for improvement network regulation for enhancing the share of DG 
57 
In Finland, there is no concern about AS provided by DG. At TSO level the minimum 
requirement for the most ancillary services is 10 MW. 
DG participation into the AS in France is not mandatory, but there are clear incentives 
to provide them. DG “dispatchable”, mainly based on small diesel units, can participate 
both in reactive power control and in short-term balancing services (used for peak shav-
ing). Cogeneration units can also sign contracts with DSOs. The DG operator then com-
mits itself to make its full production capacity available for the system between the last 
day of October, November, December, January or February (the choice of the day is set 
up by contract) and the 1st of April. The buyer (the DSO) sends everyday a fax stating 
whether the plant will be asked to produce or not the day after. The remuneration of the 
producers includes: i)a fixed component based on the actual availability of the plant; ii) 
a component based on natural gas prices; iii) a remuneration for the energy injected into 
the system during the “call periods”, i.e. when asked by the DSO; iv) a remuneration for 
the energy injected at the initiative of the producer; and v) a bonus for energy effi-
ciency. 
In Germany, pooled DG units can participate into the balancing market. There are auc-
tions for balancing power where one can apply with a minimum amount of 30 MW; 
there is an IPP who pools decentralised power plants and markets them to the balancing 
market. 
In Italy, there is not specific compensation for DG participating into AS, small units are 
not supposed to contribute to balancing and reserve services, although DG units are in-
centivazed to produce energy during peak hours. 
In Netherlands, DG units of above 5MW and connected to more than 1kV voltage net-
works can provide AS. DG can participate into both balancing markets (through market 
aggregators) and reactive power control. However, in practice there is no real contribu-
tion of DG to reactive power control. 
In Spain, DG can participate in different AS. DG units have incentives to keep power 
factors within specific margins or penalties if they go out of required margins. DG un-
der feed-in premiums can participate in ancillary services markets run by the TSO, bal-
ancing and reserves, as other conventional generators. Prediction of the day-ahead en-
ergy production is mandatory for DG larger than 10 MW, and deviations over a settled 
range are penalized.  
In UK, DG can arrange with the DSO AS procurement. In practice, aggregated small 
DG can provide reserves. Bilateral Agreements are likely to continue to be used in any 
developing ancillary service market in the short to medium term, and if further studies 
are to be carried out at this stage, the focus should be on developing commercial frame-
works/agreements. 
The following table summarizes the current situation and guidelines regarding DG par-
ticipation in AS.  
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Table 13 DG participation in the procurement of AS 
DG participation in 
AS 
Countries Services Guidelines 
There is no contri-
bution of DG to AS 
Austria, 
Denmark, 
Finland, Italy 
None Include DG into 
AS. 
Participation of DG 
into AS 
France, Ger-
many, Nether-
lands, Spain, 
UK 
Reactive power control, 
balancing market and 
reserves 
Improve the con-
tribution of DG to 
AS. 
 
In most of the countries, there is still very low contribution of DG into the AS. The 
main contribution acknowledged to DG is to keep power factors within certain ranges, 
and, through aggregators, to participate in the balancing market or providing reserves. 
Furthermore they can contribute to network optimisation, e.g. contribution to congestion 
management, and contribution to (network) capacity reserve, in order to save or delay 
network reinforcement and upgrade. They can improve quality of service through 
islanding. Active network management by DSOs is a crucial transformation that is re-
quired in order to implement in practice such possibilities. 
To achieve this aim, several approaches for commercial arrangements can be thought, 
for instance, bilateral contracts between DSOs and DGs; payments from the 
TSOs/DSOs, acknowledged in the UoS charges; and/or network related markets. The 
economic signals from the TSOs/DSOs to DGs to contribute to the provision of ancil-
lary and other network services should heavily rely on the incentives they get them-
selves from the existing network regulation scheme.  
The design of network related markets such as local balancing, reactive power or energy 
losses compensation should take into account facilitate market access to every dg, espe-
cially if they are controllable. Market prices would be the correct signal for DG partici-
pation in these markets.  
R11. DG can contribute significantly to TSO/DSO ancillary and network services. DG 
through aggregators can participate in balancing and reserve markets. DG can provide 
voltage support and compensate energy losses as required by DSOs. In the future, with 
higher levels of network automation and DG controllability, DG would help to solve 
congestion management, and to improve quality islanding. Commercial arrangements 
between TSO/DSO and DG to recognize such contribution can be 
- Regulated payments to DG, for instance acknowledged in the UoS charges 
- Bilateral contracts between DG and DSO  
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- DG participation in markets: i) energy balancing and reserve markets; and ii) 
network related markets, such as local balancing, reactive power, congestion 
management, or energy losses compensation. 
Regulation level: National MS Regulators.  
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In addition, the following references have been used by DG-GRID partners answering 
the national questionnaires. 
4.2 Country questionnaire references 
4.2.1 Austria 
See the regulator’s site: www.e-control.at 
4.2.2 Denmark 
http://www.energitilsynet.dk/english/ 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/publications/doc/2006_03_08_final_comm
on_report.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/publications/doc/2006_03_08_annexes.pdf 
http://www.elforsk.dk/ 
http://www.energinet.dk 
You might also find a lot of information at Annual Energy Statistics (Danish En-
ergy Agency): 
http://www.ens.dk/sw16508.asp 
Look at the reports:  Energy in Denmark   and   Energy Statistics 2005 and 
download the excel og ppt files Graphs or Figures 
4.2.3 Finland 
http://www.energiamarkkinavirasto.fi/index2.asp?languageid=826&start=1 
4.2.4 France 
Websites: 
The French regulator’s website: www.cre.fr 
The website of the Direction of Energy and Raw Materials, French Ministry of 
Industry: http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie 
Documents of reference: 
Annual report of the French Energy Regulatory Commission - CRE 2006 
(http://www.cre.fr/uk_documents/rapporta.jsp#) 
CRE, 2005, “Règles tarifaires pour l’utilisation des réseaux publics d’électricité” 
(Pricing rules for the use of public electricity networks), in French, and its “ex-
posé des motifs” (explanatory statement, with an English version available) 
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Document (in French) from the Ministry of Industry: “Modèle de contrat d’achat 
d’énergie cogénération : avenant mode dispatchable » (Model of purchase con-
tract for cogeneration : complement concerning « dispatchable mode ») 
Some information directly came from the French regulator and from EDF. 
4.2.5 Germany 
The homepage of the German regulator (www.bundesnetzagentur.de) is proba-
bly the best source; unfortunately nearly all documents are in German 
A good source is of course DG Tren with the benchmarking reports. 
4.2.6 Italy 
Websites 
- Italian regulator, Autorita per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas (AEEG), 
www.autoritaenergia.it 
- Italian TSO : www.terna.it 
Documents of reference 
- Annual report of the AEEG, 2006 (English version and Italian version for de-
tails) 
- Annual report for the European Commission, AEEG, 31/07/2006 
The information collected also directly came from the Italian regulator. 
4.2.7 Netherlands 
4.2.8 Spain 
-Spanish Energy Regulator, http://www.cne.es/ 
-Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs. Special Regimen Section.  
http://www.mityc.es/Electricidad/Seccion/ProductoresEspecial/Productores/ 
-Spanish Wind Energy Association, http://www.aeeolica.org/ 
-Renewable Energy news in Spain, http://www.energias-renovables.com/ 
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4.2.9 UK 
- “Engineering Recommendation P2/6. Security of Supply”, Energy Networks 
Association, July 2006. 
- DTI, Research On International Distributed Generation Practice (Phase Two). 
2004 
- DTI, UK Response to the Commission Green Paper: A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy. June 2006  
- Ofgem, Electricity Distribution Price Control Review. Regulatory Impact As-
sessment for Registered Power Zones and the Innovation Funding Incentive. 
2004 
- Ofgem, Electricity Distribution Price Control Review Final proposals, Novem-
ber 2004 
- http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem/shared/template2.jsp?id=1274 
- http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem/shared/template2.jsp?id=9989 
- Ofgem, Electricity Distribution Cost Review 2005-2006, January 2007 
- Ofgem, Open Letter Consultation on the Innovation Funding Incentive and Reg-
istered Power Zone Schemes for Distribution Network Operators. February 2007 
- Ofgem, Renewables Obligation: Annual report 2005-06. 28 February 2007 
- Ofgem, Distributed Energy, A Call for Evidence for the Review of Barriers and 
Incentives to Distributed Electricity Generation, Including Combined Heat and 
Power. November 2006 
- http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem/microsites/microtemplate1.jsp?toplevel=/micro
sites/edist&assortment=/microsites/edist/edist06 
- Ofgem, Structure of electricity distribution charges, Consultation on the longer 
term charging framework. May 2005 
- DTI, Ancillary Service Provision from Distributed Generation. 2004 
 
 
